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ABSTRACT 
For nearly two centuries, United States (U.S.) political policy and non-
government organizations (NGOs) had delivered foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) 
when and where needed. The logistical capability of the professional U.S. military has 
allowed it to become an enduring delivery method for FHA. Since the 2000s, Congress 
has actively shaped the Department of Defense’s (DoD) role in humanitarian operations 
through a wide variety of authorities contained in the Armed Services (Title 10 U.S. 
Code) and Foreign Relations and Intercourse (Title 22 U.S. Code) statutes, and through 
annual legislation. Each branch of the military has also developed more defined doctrines 
in response to this increasing role in FHA. The U.S. army has developed the Army’s 
Technique Publication 3-57.20 in order to prepare for an increased humanitarian role. 
This thesis will challenge traditional notions of U.S. military FHA that places its 
origins either at the creation of the United Nations (UN) and the Truman Doctrine in the 
late 1940s, or at the Spanish-American War of 1898. That year, the American populace 
created a growing demand to right the wrongs committed by the seemingly inept and 
corrupt Spanish Empire. When action did finally come, the American people landed an 
army on the shores of a battered people. Incidentally, the United States did not land its 
troops on foreign soil in 1898 in the name of humanitarianism for the first time. No, 
decades of prior experience and custom fell alongside those troops. From aiding in the 
suppression of the Atlantic slave trade beginning in 1819 to providing order and medical 
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attention to the people of Alexandria near the end of the century, the United States began 
a tradition of using its military for FHA that proves nearly as old as the nation itself. 
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INTRODUCTION 
While humanitarianism is a simple concept, the act of carrying it out has not been. 
In its most general form, humanitarianism is merely an act of sympathy and benevolence 
extended universally to all of mankind. As simple as the concept may be, academic 
writers and journalists continue to show the complex relationship governments and non-
government organizations hold with the complex noun. Since the eighteenth century, the 
basic notion of humanitarianism began to appear in theological and philosophical texts. 
Theologians and philosophers such as Ernst Troeltsch, William Wilberforce, and Samuel 
Romilly gave notice that philanthropic and charitable individuals believed all of mankind 
could be improved by deliberate social change. According to Troeltsch, “their aim was a 
new spirit, not a new society.”1 Eventually, this motive lead to involvement from both 
like-minded NGOs and governments. Questions began to arise, could humanitarianism 
still exist with government-backed organizations, and if so, how? From the Berlin Airlift 
in the 1940s to the 2014 airstrikes against ISIS targets in Iraq, governments continue to 
show the popularity of carrying out military-led humanitarian actions. 2 Although 
secondary sources are numerous on this topic, especially in regards to the United States 
military and foreign humanitarian assistance, they are all incomplete. The notion that the 
government, let alone its military, can improve society by deliberate social change seems 
                                                 
1 Ernst Troeltsch, The social teaching of the Christian churches (London: Allen & Unwin, 1950), p. 135. 
2 Rachel Marsden, “Humanitarianism in the Form of Airstrikes,” Townhall, October 7, 2014, 
http://townhall.com/columnists/rachelmarsden/2014/10/07/humanitarianism-in-the-form-of-airstrikes-
n1902013. 
2 
 
 
impossible, especially to dunantist.3 The United States, with its military, proved capable 
of achieving this seemingly impossible feat in the nineteenth century. From aiding in the 
suppression of the Atlantic slave trade beginning in 1819 to providing order and medical 
attention to the people of Alexandria near the end of the century, the United States began 
a tradition of using its military for FHA that proves nearly as old as the nation itself. 
Before going any further into the paper, it is essential to understand two terms, 
foreign humanitarianism and abolitionism, and their relationship to the American 
military. Foreign humanitarianism are a series of consistent programs conducted in order 
to reduce or relieve the results of manmade or natural disasters or other rampant 
circumstances such as disease, human pain, hunger, or any hardship that results in 
excessive damage to or loss of property or presents a serious peril to life. Any foreign 
humanitarianism assistance (FHA) by U.S. military forces is limited in both duration and 
scope. All FHA operations are conducted outside of any American possessions and 
territories. These operations exclude any events that occur within the borders of federal 
government lands, such as the American Civil War or various skirmishes that occurred 
between Native Americans and Americans. In 1831, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia that “the court ... after mature deliberation ... is of opinion 
that an Indian tribe or nation within the United States is not a foreign state in the sense of 
the constitution.”4 They declared that any and all Native American tribes in the country 
                                                 
3 Named after Henry Dunant, the man who inspired the creation of the International Committee of the Red 
Cross, the name refers to a group of humanitarian practitioners who believe in neutrality, impartiality, 
independence, and humanity. More information can be in the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) 
Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Briefing Paper, “Humanitarian NGOS: Challenges and Trends,” 
http://www.odi.org/publications/272-humanitarian-ngos-challenges-trends.  
4 United States Supreme Court. “Cherokee Nation v. Georgia 30 U.S. 1 (1831).” Justia,  
https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/30/1/. 
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were instead “domestic nations,” and not afforded the rights of nations.5 Foreign 
humanitarianism is not only intentional but creates a deliberate social change. 
Abolitionism is the movement to abolish slavery. In the U.S., this movement 
concentrated on the abolishment of African-American, specifically black, slavery. 
Although small in size, American abolitionists accomplished their goal with various 
levels of aid from federal and state governments. This aid came in numerous forms that 
included laws abolishing United States involvement in domestic and international slave 
trades, as well as the establishment of free nations supported by time-restricted U.S. Navy 
patrols. These patrols also aided, to some degree, in combating the international slave 
trade found throughout the waters of West Africa. 
The United States and Europe share a connected history and the people and ideas 
buried within that antiquity. As such, the eighteenth century Age of Reason found in 
Europe saw the objectives of humanitarianism being infused with the Christian faith. One 
of the most notable manifestations of this new humanitarianism was the antislavery 
movement that had gained significant ground in the domestic politics of England. In 
1774, a simple court case saw to the end of slavery within the country. From that point 
until 1807, a determined movement saw to the abolition of slavery as a global institution. 
Within the British Empire, William Wilberforce and his fellow abolitionists helped to 
eliminate Britain’s involvement in the traffic at home by 1807. A mere twenty-six years 
later, slavery would be abolished throughout the British colonies. This sentiment found 
throughout the British Empire did not end there, for a portion of their intellectual and 
blood relatives across the Atlantic Ocean in the New World held the same spirit within 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
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them. A spirit found in the regional and national politics, ideologies, and laws that began 
with a revolution in 1776. 
While many historians have acknowledged that the United States has used the 
concept of humanitarianism in its international endeavors since 1898, those scholars fail 
to connect the dots between early American military FHA found in providing emergency 
services in the nineteenth century and those same actions found in later centuries. Donald 
Canney, Brownell Everill, Eric Burin, and Henry A. Crosby Forbes are all considered the 
authorities on their subjects. Their areas of research range from the U.S. African 
Squadron to the Great Hunger in Ireland. While all of these scholars have written on 
singular events that fall within the realm of foreign humanitarianism, none gave the topic 
any particular attention. Canney wrote a book that covers the span of the U.S. African 
Squadron, and nearly ignores half of its history.6 Everill allotted for greater space than 
that in regards to humanitarianism, but even her account fails to take notice of the U.S. 
military’s contributions to that field.7 Forbes’ examination of a dire Ireland provides 
perhaps the greatest account of a nineteenth century act of humanitarianism by a military 
but centers his work on the political and social relationships between Ireland and the 
British.8 This focus limits American involvement to only a few paragraphs. The depiction 
of these humanitarian crises despite the critical analysis historians, have brought to 
individual events, continue to remain relatively the same. While there is clear evidence to 
show the United States allowed its military to be used to perform deeds of FHA, either at 
                                                 
6 Donald L. Canney, Africa Squadron the U.S. Navy and the Slave Trade, 1842–1861 (Washington, DC: 
Potomac Books, 2006), p. x. 
7 Bronwen Everill, Abolition and Empire in Sierra Leone and Liberia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2013), p. 157. 
8 H. A. Crosby Forbes, Massachusetts Help to Ireland During the Great Famine (Milton, Massachusetts: 
Captain Robert Bennet Forbes House, 1967), pp. 5–6. 
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the behest of a naval officer or the acting President and Congress, the historians who have 
either written about the slave trade, blights in Ireland, or on theories of how a nation acts 
tend to ignore the American military’s global contributions and focus more on individuals 
such as Matthew Perry. Other historians, such as Joseph G. Dawson, argue that the U.S. 
military’s role in the nineteenth century reflects that of its counterpart in a post-World 
War II era but merely leave it there. An incomplete observation permeates many of the 
secondary sources on the U.S. military’s role in nineteenth century foreign 
humanitarianism. Certainly causing the pendulum to swing in dunantist’s favor meant 
connecting American imperialism in 1898 with acts of government-led humanitarianism. 
However, such like the chroniclers during the Spanish-American War in 1898 and later 
wars, the historians on nineteenth century humanitarianism looked at the politicians and 
activists rather than the military officers. 
The purpose of this thesis is not to give praise to military humanitarianism or 
endorse an image of the American military as a seemingly altruistic institution. A military 
acts according to a multitude of economic, political, and social motivations. The purpose 
is to highlight how, through a continual involvement in providing foreign aid such as 
foodstuffs, fire containment, and police support, the American military’s involvement 
with foreign humanitarian assistance does not begin at the end of the nineteenth century, 
but rather the beginning. That is something for which the early American military never 
receives credit. Research into this topic has made it apparent that the soldiers and officers 
of that body affected the lives of men and women around the global through deliberate 
social change. While the United States and its military hold their fair share of 
congratulatory accounts, they also hold a fair share of detractors, specifically from anti-
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imperialist and dunantist or dunantist-like scholars. This paper does not set out to argue 
whether or not military forces should be used to carry out humanitarian action. It is 
individuals who make up the American military and bring with them beliefs born from 
both regional and national political and social beliefs. While officers such as Rear 
Admiral Reginald F. Nicholson lent use of his ships as temporary hospitals, other officers 
took vengeance out on native islanders in the Pacific Ocean over perceived affronts to 
their authority.9 Nor does this paper make the argument that Southern politicians did not 
affect the success of the American naval squadron in Africa. Instead, this paper examines 
the growing domestic and international need to abolish slavery, horrific famines that 
killed nearly killed nearly one in four people, and a growing socioeconomic and political 
reach of a young nation that pushed the American military intro providing various forms 
of foreign humanitarian aid beginning in the early nineteenth century. 
                                                 
9 Harry Allanson Ellsworth, One Hundred Eighty Landing of United States Marines 1800–1934 
(Washington, DC: History and Museums Division Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 2013), p. 75. 
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Figure 1. “U.S. Military Engagements Abroad, 1789–1860.” Blank map from 
Maphill.10 
                                                 
10 This list is representative of U.S. military foreign humanitarian assistance and does not include the 
entirety of nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first century activities. All dates, locations, and types of 
activities were gathered from the source materials under Table A.1 in Appendix. 
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CHAPTER ONE: AN INCOMPLETE HISTORY 
Scholars such as John Ries and Gaines M. Foster have demonstrated a consistent 
use of military forces by the American government to handle foreign humanitarian crises 
from 1898 onward. Despite their academic accomplishments, these scholars have yet to 
connect this method of handling crises with earlier American history. The various pieces 
of scholarship that spans from the topics of regional versus national politics to singular 
actions of nineteenth century American humanitarianism are all stepping stones to a 
larger picture. A historiography captures this representation.11 It is this study of history 
that allows the reader to understand where a new thesis belongs amidst others that came 
before. In addition, by separating a historiography into multiple segments, it allows for a 
more diverse understanding of the subject at hand.  
While no single piece of research will ever be capable of telling the whole story 
with every actor, thought, and motivation involved, it does not need to accomplish this 
impossible task. Scholars build off the work of one another and because of this, it will 
always remain important to hold an understanding of the historiography. Each idea 
central to a scholar’s work is merely a new piece to the puzzle. 
Regional and National Politics 
It is always easy to view the military as a tool of destruction, manipulated by 
geopolitical struggles. Images of horrific military massacres, often created at the bidding 
                                                 
11 A historiography is merely the history of written history. It is meant to show the reader how scholars 
have come to treat a particular field of history, such as military or environmental. It serves a multitude of 
reasons, one of which can be to show where historians have yet to venture. 
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of civilian leaders, such as the Nanking Massacre, the Holocaust, and the Adana 
massacre, litter history books. While it is true that militaries can be an instrument used 
for destruction, on that same token, they are also used for protection. A tool, one which is 
always influenced by local and national sociopolitical justifications, which the American 
people have often found a purpose for within the humanitarian world. These 
ideologically-fuelled political agendas give birth to the American military’s basis, and 
when combined with a stable and secure society led to the creation of new purposes for a 
military that extends beyond the realm of security. 
When discussing the American military and international humanitarianism, 
images such as the Berlin Airlift or the 2010 Operation Unified Response in Haiti appear 
quickly. Others, such as providing temporary security in Colombia during political 
turmoil in the 1860s, appear slowly or not at all. This absence of knowledge leads to a 
narrative of discontinuity. While many scholars have continued along this path, others, 
such as Robert Kagan, Howard Zinn, and William Appleman Williams, have uncovered a 
fuller narrative, one where the United States does not simply leap from a position of 
isolationism to that of a world power following World War II. 
Although not the first to challenge the discontinuity narrative, Kagan’s 
Dangerous Nations is a landmark study of an otherwise stagnant history. Kagan’s unique 
experience as a foreign policy advisor12 and American historian led him to question the 
accuracy of American foreign policy history. By believing in an old narrative where 
Americans do not emerge onto the global stage until World War II, or in some instances 
1898, myths begin to arise. These folktales paint early American history as relatively 
                                                 
12 Kagan has served as a foreign policy advisor to multiple U.S. Republican presidential candidates, as well 
as to Hilary Clinton while she served as Secretary of State under President Barrack Obama. 
10 
 
 
non-aggressive and anti-colonial with these traits only emerging in the twentieth century. 
The sum of these beliefs paints the United States as an isolated state. Kagan challenges 
this long-held belief and makes the argument that “…this colonial America was 
characterised not by isolationism and utopianism, not by cities upon hills and covenants 
with God, but by aggressive expansionism, acquisitive materialism, and an overarching 
ideology of civilisation that encouraged and justified both.”13 Although aggressive land 
acquisition and the United States go hand in hand, as its history supports, it must be noted 
that American foreign policy is defined neither by a singular or cohesive national interest. 
Rather, it is built, in part, upon shifting regional alliances and compromises.14 This 
knowledge that the United States history is one of an expansionist and ideologically-
fueled people existing within a complex local political system helps to capture the 
fundamental relationship between the nation’s foreign policy and its nature. The former 
reflects the national idea, no matter what it may be and how it may change over the 
course of time. 
Although the national plan may change over time, as well as regional alliances 
and the outcomes they produce for American foreign policy, the United States has rested 
upon universal principles imbued into American society from its inauguration. Its values 
are not only relevant to the world, but applicable as well.15 From early American 
politicians, abolitionists, freedom-fighters, and capitalists, the United States military 
would find itself projected onto the global arena.  In this ring, the military would become 
                                                 
13 Robert Kagan, Dangerous Nation: America’s Foreign Policy from Its Earliest Days to the Dawn of the 
Twentieth Century (New York: Knopf, 2006), p. 10. 
14 Peter Trubowitz, Defining the National Interest: Conflict and Change in American Foreign Policy 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), p. 18. 
15 Walter Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World 
(New York: Knopf, 2001), pp. 310–311. 
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destined to not only protect American commercial interests abroad, but the social and 
humanitarian beliefs of the young republic. 
Although imbued with universal principles since its inception, scholars, 
politicians, and the American population in general have argued with one another about 
which principles should lead the nation’s foreign policy. Walter McDougall, professor of 
international relations at the University of Pennsylvania, examined the entirety of the 
history of U.S. foreign policy, using religious terminology16 to create two distinct 
periods. At its most basic level, McDougall’s thesis argues that there is a fundamental 
contradiction in U.S. foreign policy, wherein two competing doctrines are each 
influenced by four separate themes. He contends that upon its founding, the U.S. entered 
its Old Testament phase (the Promised Land) founded upon four traditions:  
Old Testament (Promised Land) 
1. Exceptionalism (avoid entangling alliances, focus upon liberty at home) 
2. Unilateralism (as opposed to isolationism) 
3. The American System (Monroe Doctrine) 
4. Expansionism (Manifest Destiny)17 
Until 1898, the Promised Land formed the foundation for American foreign 
policy. 1898, and forward, mark the second phase of American foreign policy, the New 
Testament (Crusader State). Like its predecessor, McDougall argues that four traditions 
affect the second phase, as well: 
New Testament (Crusader State) 
1. Progressive Imperialism 
                                                 
16 McDougall uses religious terminology based on the notion that early American foreign policy is based on 
religious reasoning and that all subsequent foreign policies hold some basis in this reasoning.  
17 Walter A. McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter with the World Since 
1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), p. 10. 
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2. Liberal Internationalism (Wilsonianism) 
3. Containment 
4. Global Meliorism (fixing the internal problems of other nations)18 
Unfortunately, while McDougall shows the universal principles imbued in 
American society, he still builds his thesis upon some of the myths scholars such as 
Kagan and Peter Trubowitz have attempted to correct. He uses evidence such as the flow 
of capital and trade overseas to argue against American isolationism in the nineteenth 
century; McDougall insists that the American government only began to pursue 
humanitarianism within its foreign policy in 1898.19 
McDougall does not stand alone in the presumption that government foreign 
humanitarianism began in 1898 and not prior. Both Louis Perez and Greg Grandin 
support the idea that the American government did not begin to use humanitarianism as a 
tool until the Spanish-American War of 1898.20 However, both their research supports 
the claim that the United States did not display isolationist behavior when compared to a 
nation such as Tokugawa Japan. Unlike Japan, which applied strict restrictions upon 
international trade during that time in its history, the United States did not apply the same 
limitations upon its merchants, citizens, or use of military. In a direct comparison to 
Tokugawa Japan, the United States has never practiced any form of full isolationist 
policies. While these scholars all come to the same conclusion that the American 
government never exhibited any isolationist foreign policies, they do not credit the U.S. 
military with any acts of foreign humanitarianism until 1898. In the case of Perez, he 
                                                 
18 Ibid., p. 10. 
19 Ibid., pp. 174–5. 
20 Greg Grandin, Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New 
Imperialism (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2006), pp. 3–4. 
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berates the American government and media industry as selling war to the American 
people by depicting Cubans as a threat to American liberty and freedom.21 Despite the 
exaggeration of foreign nations and their people, American foreign policy centered on the 
achievement of one goal: protecting American liberty. 
If the U.S. did not exhibit real isolationist behavior, the importance of civil 
society grows tremendously. Kathleen D. McCarthy, a historian, has argued that early 
America subscribed to the “American Creed” that linked religious freedom with 
egalitarianism to the right to engage in civic activism.22 Like McDougall and Kagan, 
McCarthy believes that America began as an ideologically imbedded society. She defines 
this philanthropic behavior as “that segment of social activity that encompasses the 
giving of time and money for public benefit.”23 From her perspective, it is not the actor’s 
motivations that are necessary, but rather the results. 
By focusing upon specific themes, McCarthy shows the importance of 
understanding civil society in America. Among the ideas that stand out are the voluntary 
sphere, the market, and the relationships between the government and society. An 
examination of U.S. political figures, such as Duff Green, reveals how civil society and 
the federal and local governments influenced one another. Green made it his mission in 
life to “maintain the rights of people.”24 This sense to preserve the rights of people, a 
sentiment shared by more than just Green, led some Americans to join in filibustering 
                                                 
21 Louis A. Perez Jr., The War of 1898: The United States and Cuba in History and Historiography (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina, 1998), p. 96. 
22 Kathleen D. McCarthy, American Creed: Philanthropy and the Rise of Civil Society, 1700–1865 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 24. 
23 Ibid., p. 202. 
24 W. Stephen Belko, The Invincible Duff Green: Whig of the West (Columbia: University of Missouri 
Press, 2006), p. 72. 
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expeditions. During these expeditions fueled not only by ideological and psychological 
desires, but romanticism, as well, men participated in militia attacks on nations they felt 
threatened American liberty abroad.25 The line that separated the public and private 
spheres remained continuously blurred. Civil society has never been in some Golden Age 
state where it operated entirely independent from the state. The real strength of civil 
society laid in the proliferation of associations in America that allowed for the promotion 
of regional political interests and values.  
Upon closer examination, American foreign policy does not hold a simple history 
of mere isolationism. It is highly complex, made up of geopolitical struggles, both within 
and outside of the United States. From private and the professional U.S. military to 
merchant ships and Christian missionaries, the American people have been propelled by 
their philosophical and political ideology to extend past their national boundaries. 
Philosophical Ideology, International Law, & Legitimacy 
The motivations for humanitarian aid are never a white and black affair, despite a 
human desire for it to be otherwise. If a citizen of the state becomes involved in a 
humanitarian endeavor, such as volunteering at a soup kitchen, society views that action 
as altruistic in nature. The same is not always true, if instead of the individual 
volunteering his or her assets, it was the federal government. Society becomes split while 
deciding what the prime stimulus is for the government to become involved in a 
humanitarian matter; even more so when the government uses the professional military to 
carry out that humanitarian aid. Guiding this split are two core concepts, realism and 
idealism. A realist would assess regime relief as having roots in national self-interests. 
                                                 
25 Robert E. May, Manifest Destiny's Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2002), p. 112. 
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An idealist would evaluate that same government support as merely a reaction to the need 
to help others during their time of misfortune. The realization of this split is far from new 
for the academic world. From Michael W. Doyle to Kenneth R. Rizer, scholars have 
sought to find the primary motivator that drives governments to intervene during 
moments of humanitarian crises. Unfortunately, there is no universal answer that fits 
neatly into all available data. Rather, self-interests and civil society’s ideas of morality 
force governments to commit resources—such as militaries—during these moments of 
calamities. 
In 2008, George P. Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin released Defending Humanity 
When Force is Justified and Why out into the academic world. Fletcher, one of the 
leading scholars in the field of torts and criminal law, and Ohlin, a criminal and 
international law expert at the Cornell University Law School, tackles one of the most 
important and controversial questions ever asked: When is war justified? Though their 
book revolves around one of the most debatable questions ever, Fletcher and Ohlin 
naturally extend their question to include justifications for the use of militaries for 
humanitarian missions. With their extensive credentials, these are two men who have 
become authorities in contemporary international relations. 
Militaries exist for one primary reason, to ensure the continuation of the regime in 
the presence of a threat, both domestic and foreign. At the core, Fletcher and Ohlin build 
the assertion of three proposals central to the study of the use of force in the global 
theater around one fundamental idea, self-defense. According to these two scholars, 
governments not only have the right to use force to repel overt attacks on their soil, but 
they may also launch preemptive strikes. Preemptive strikes require legitimacy in order to 
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justify them before the international community. Nations need justification at the 
international level as a way to reduce the chances of damaging a relation with a third 
party. Fletcher and Ohlin articulate no defined parameters but subject, “that imminence 
must be something broader than troops crossing the border, but something narrower than 
mere preparations for war such as strategic planning.”26 It is this principle of self-defense 
that helps justify military action between nations. A concept where there exists such a 
thing as preemptive self-defense so long as “either a threatened use of force was 
imminent or not.”27 
The entire question behind their book is controversial, but how they have applied 
the principles of self-defense to humanitarianism may prove to be not only highly 
provocative for years to come, but innovative as well. Governments have the right to use 
force in order to provide assistance to other governments who face an imminent threat. 
They can also extend that use of force to aid what they term “nations” within other 
countries. This concept of nations, the authors stated, “…as opposed to the more cabined 
notion of internationally recognized states, refers to groups of peoples defined by 
ethnicity, religion, and/or culture.”28 While the use of militaries for humanitarian 
missions is a highly debated topic among scholars and politicians, most nations and civil 
societies do agree that peoples hold the inalienable right of self-defense. Although they 
may lack legal personalities under international law, the principle of self-defense gives 
governments some semblance of legitimacy not only to intervene on behalf of 
                                                 
26 George P. Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin, Defending Humanity: When Force is Justified and Why (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 159. 
27 Joel C. Gaydos and George A. Luz, “Military Participation in Emergency Humanitarian Assistance,” 
Disasters 18, no. 1 (1994): pp. 51–52. 
28 Fletcher and Ohlin, When Defending Humanity, p. 138. 
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beleaguered governments, but also on behalf of nations within them. For example, when 
the U.S. intervened on behalf of Kosovo, its actions were justified because, within Serbia, 
the Albanian Kosovar community could be defined as a distinct nation facing possible 
annihilation.29 
While, in theory, the principle of self-defense can be used legitimately by a 
government to intervene on the behalf of a battered nation with the use of force, Fletcher 
and Ohlin’s efforts to expand this concept only shows how little the debate on military 
humanitarian missions has moved toward a definitive conclusion. The authors do 
demonstrate how this action can be subject to persecution by other states, especially in 
instances where botched intelligence led to an incorrect assertion of the situation. The 
U.S. defense of Kosovo is a prime example on the use of force for a humanitarian cause. 
There is no accepted metric in the international community that assesses when the use of 
force becomes justified to defend these “nations of victims” in their countries.30 
Unfortunately for Fletcher and Ohlin, their argument demonstrates how it becomes 
increasingly difficult to police international behavior as the context in which force is 
either justified or excused becomes more subjective. Given how governments and civil 
societies can have widely divergent views on the legitimacy of military humanitarian 
intervention and assistance, it is unlikely that a consensus can be gained to differentiate 
between aggression and defense on humanitarian grounds. Despite whatever limitations 
Defending Humanity contains, the book does prod both the reader and the international 
community to rethink when coercion becomes justifiable. 
                                                 
29 Alynna J. Lyon and Chris J. Dolan, “American Humanitarian Intervention: Toward a Theory of 
Coevolution,” Foreign Policy Analysis 3, no. 1 (2007): pp. 62–63. 
30 Joshua James Kassner, Rwanda and the Moral Obligation of Humanitarian Intervention (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2012), p. 207. 
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When governments deploy militaries, some level of justification or legitimacy 
must exist. A point Fletcher and Ohlin continually made in respect to self-defense. In that 
regard, these two authors are building their argument off the work of other scholars, such 
as Martha Finnemore. Research into the political and social theory of legitimacy, in 
regards to the use of force, has been a central pillar of both international law and military 
studies for decades. Recently Fletcher, Ohlin, and Finnemore, representatives of a new 
group of scholars, have begun to examine the concept of legitimacy in a slightly different 
light. Finnemore, a constructivist scholar of international relations, has examined recent 
changes in military interventions, not in terms of technology, but rather on the concept of 
legitimacy. While she is not entirely successful in identifying long-term changes in 
norms, she does break new ground on showing the link between purpose and state power. 
Research revolves around five basic questions: who, why, where, when, and how. 
Finnemore, as a constructivist, instead focuses on the how or the how possible. In The 
Purpose of Intervention, she investigates how states have come to different beliefs on 
what creates legitimacy for the use of force (military intervention). She makes the 
argument that “notions about order have become increasingly legalized and rationalized,” 
the reasoning behind interventions has changed dramatically.31 For instance, countries 
must be wary of using war as their primary tool for political gain as other states may react 
quickly and with great force, posing a threat to the continuation of their regime. As a 
result, war has become less valued than it would have been viewed merely a century ago. 
                                                 
31 Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2003), p. 22. 
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For these individuals or political entities, war has become increasingly difficult to 
legitimize before the eyes of the international community.32 
Regarding changes in warfare and the use of professional militaries, Finnemore 
indicates that the dominant argument in security studies would expect any changes in the 
use of force to be the outcome of physical factors such as variations in the balance of 
power between states or in offensive-defensive balance. In fact, as Finnemore points out, 
what has not changed is the number of weapons or defense systems a state possesses.33 
Rather, what has changed is the states’ understanding in how power exists within the 
international community and legal system. This change in outlook toward action still 
makes states the primary actors and their continued existence paramount. Finnemore 
theorizes that countries have embraced particular reasoning for interventions while 
rejecting others.34 It is this attempt to account for universal behavior that makes this piece 
of scholarship a significant contribution to the literature. Finnemore comes to the 
conclusion that there are three cases (reasoning’s) that account for interventionist 
behavior. They are: 
• Intervention for debt collection; 
• Humanitarian, multilateral military interventions; and 
• Intervention because of threats to international peace and security.35 
                                                 
32 Sarah Kenyon Lischer, “Humanitarian Aid is Not a Military Business,” Christian Science Monitor 95, 
no. 97 (2003): p. 9. 
33 Finnemore, Purpose of Intervention, p. 2. 
34 Nellie Bristol, “Military Incursions into Aid Work Anger Humanitarian Groups,” The Lancet 367, no. 
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35 Kathy Chen, “American Troops Leave Haiti,” The Wall Street Journal, May 31, 2010. 
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War always contains a level of uncertainty and mystery. Why politicians, citizens, 
or generals nudge a country into escalating an event where the use of force is required, or 
at least be seen as the only viable option is never merely a black and white affair. While it 
will likely always remain questionable as to whether or not military interventions can 
indeed be called humanitarian, what remains true is a fundamental human desire to help 
others in their time of need. As long as citizens volunteer, with no incentive for 
themselves, to assist one another, civil society will treat this social or moral desire as a 
responsibility of the state. As scholars, such as Finnemore have shown, even the purest of 
intentions carries with them the political desires of the state. Unfortunately, for both 
humanity and nations, there is no universal answer that fits neatly into the data. Rather, to 
uncover the motivations that push states to expand military resources on humanitarian 
missions, scholars must focus their research on a nations’ self-interests and civil society’s 
ideas of morality in order to understand why countries act as they do during these 
moments. 
19th Century Military Humanitarianism 
At its most basic core, humanitarianism is merely a desire of one individual to 
help out another. This desire often overlaps with others, be they political or economic in 
nature. Since the creation of the United Nations (U.N.) in 1945, the U.S., along with other 
nation-states, has become extensively involved in global humanitarian efforts. It is also 
worth mentioning that non-government organizations (NGOs) also share in these efforts, 
in some form. Humanitarianism is not only providing medical aid and supplies to those in 
need, it can involve the use of force. When a state decides to use force, this humanitarian 
effort can be defined as a humanitarian intervention. These efforts walk a fine line. Stray 
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too far one way or the other and humanitarian intervention can turn into the mere 
invasion of one country by another. By examining humanitarian interventionism in this 
light, the U.S. finds its history in this field becomes much older. In order to provide some 
measure of sustained humanitarianism, governments must have the backing of civil 
society. In the early nineteenth century, the U.S. found this initial support in the form of 
antislavery and anti-British sentiments. 
In November of 2006, the first full-length book written about the U.S. Africa 
Squadron, a naval squadron that operated in and around the western coast of Africa, 
found its way into the academic world. Donald L. Canney, the author of this milestone 
and a respected naval historian, set out not to tell how this squadron failed at its mission, 
but why. Africa Squadron: The U.S. Navy and the Slave Trade, 1842–1861 not only 
covers a long neglected history of the U.S. Navy, but helps to demonstrate how 
humanitarian efforts can involve the U.S. military. As it stands now, Canney is the 
leading expert on the U.S. African Squadron. 
The Atlantic slave trade has received a considerable amount of attention from 
historians to sociologists. While all of these scholars have contributed significantly to this 
field, they have all tended to dismiss the efforts of the U.S. Africa Squadron in curbing 
the slave trade between the years 1819 and 1861. Even Canney has dismissed a 
noteworthy aspect of the Squadron by merely glancing over its early history. Only within 
the last year have some scholars begun to link the Africa Squadron with humanitarianism. 
Despite this fact, even these new scholars have failed to connect this squadron with a 
larger overarching theme of humanitarianism that has proven prevalent throughout the 
history of the U.S. military. The approval of the U.S. Africa Squadron by Congress marks 
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the beginning point for the use of the professional U.S. military in foreign humanitarian 
matters. Although Canney neglects to address this point, he does help to close a 
significant gap in U.S. naval history. 
Although this scholarship neglects to contribute any groundbreaking view of 
slavery or humanitarianism, Canney does provide an excellent chronicle of the activities 
of the Squadron. Canney mainly focuses on the Squadron after the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty of 1842, a moment where this Atlantic squadron received the much-needed federal 
funding that was necessary to accomplish its mission.36 It is from the perspectives of its 
officers around which Canney crafts his narrative. This approach not only helps to 
personalize each tale told, but helps to explain some of the actions performed by the 
Squadron as a collective and individualistically. It is this methodology that makes his 
book unique.37 Canney also challenges long-held beliefs that the ineffectiveness of the 
Africa Squadron to end the illicit slave trade stemmed from the Southern roots of its 
commanders.  
Though Canney may focus on the squadron between 1842 and 1861, he does try 
to provide a short analysis on the early anti-slave trade history of America. He 
contributes much of the international effort to stem the slave trade with the negative 
publicity that stemmed from other navies, such as the Royal British Navy, capturing 
American slavers.38 Although Congress formed the African Slave Trade Patrol in 1819, 
Canney makes the argument that the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1841 makes the 
African Squadron unique in American naval history. Canney’s focus on a two-decade 
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period allows him to focus on his claim that the ineffectiveness of the squadron stemmed 
from the pittance granted to them by Congress in regards to funding. 
In addition to focusing on an individualistic social narrative, the author also 
examines the Africa Squadron from an economic-political viewpoint. Unlike many 
scholars who have credited the failures of the patrol on the part of Southern commanders, 
Canney argues that the squadron proved unsuccessful due to burdens placed upon it by 
naval officers from the mainland.39 In addition to holding the responsibility to capture 
pirates and slavers, the Africa Squadron also had to protect U.S. commercial interests. 
This combination of duties distracted the already pitiful amount of commanders in the 
small naval force, thus leading to their reduced effectiveness in deterring the slave trade. 
Every commander made some contribution to the slave trade patrol, and even 
though Canney focused on a multitude of senior officers, Matthew Perry appears to be 
the most significant leader of the group. Working with the ACS as a naval officer, Perry 
helped to found Liberia, a potential haven for former slaves. He notes that when 
commanders gained access to steam vessels, notably near the end of the patrol’s life, their 
effectiveness at capturing the ever elusive slave ships improved considerably.40 
Unfortunately, he neglects to mention how ships, such as the U.S.S. Macedonia, 
contributed to humanitarian efforts outside of the patrol’s existence during the Great 
Famine in Ireland. Even with the neglect to establish U.S. military humanitarianism with 
the African Slave Trade Patrol, Canney provides a valuable resource for a subject in 
American history that has gone neglected in the scholarly world for decades on end. 
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Scholars who have research interests in global African history have begun to 
expand upon the importance Western colonies in Africa made toward ending the slave 
trade. Bronwen Everill, a Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at King’s College London, 
stands among these contributors with her book Abolition and Empire in Sierra Leone and 
Liberia. With renewed interest in the reexamination of the Atlantic slave trade, Everill’s 
scholarship comes at an opportune time, a moment in which her scholarship may draw 
the interests of those outside of her chosen field and specialty. 
In terms of classifying Everill’s approach to the Atlantic abolition movement, it is 
best to view it in the light of the new imperial history approach. Having been popularized 
in recent years by scholars just as Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, this method 
takes the concepts of both empire and colony and places them into a single analytical 
field.41 By intersecting this area with aspects of identity politics, Everill pursues how 
ideas of race, gender, and class influenced the transnational interactions of nation-states.  
While the rather broad topic of antislavery colonization is not new, Everill argues 
that the entanglements and competition between Sierra Leone and Liberia have mostly 
been neglected—despite their geographical and political proximity. Her central argument 
for reexamining this nineteenth century history finds its basis not only upon the 
importance of each settlement, but their impact on metropolitan politics found in their 
motherlands. It is because neither fits neatly into the traditional imperial concept 
framework that Everill states, “Sierra Leone has frequently been treated as an anomaly, 
while Liberia is generally rejected outright.”42 Though her interests do not extend into 
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examining U.S. military humanitarianism throughout the nineteenth century, the 
questions posed by her book show a need for a greater understanding of humanitarian 
intervention.  
Even if Everill’s approach falls into the new imperials approach, it should be 
noted that she shaped much of her narrative around the communication between the 
individuals from the colonies and their imperialist founders. Not content with merely 
demonstrating how the public opinion formed by abolitionists impacted the political and 
social aspects that existed between the U.S. and Liberia, Everill explores how the 
economic interests of the colonizer impacted the colony. By examining the antislavery 
movement in economic terms, she explains how Sierra Leone and Liberia, through 
interaction with one another, served as tools in fracturing consensus and intensifying 
competition amid the antislavery networks.43   
While this scholastic work focuses primarily on the relationship between the 
colonizer and the colony, Everill readily demonstrates the complexity of the subject and 
how it quickly touches upon a number of areas relevant to historians. It marks a growing 
trend occurring in historical literature based not only on the topic of humanitarianism, but 
of imperialism and Africa.  Everill steps away from the tradition of merely examining 
white, elite adventurers, and brings the focus to the settlers.  
In the Quentin Tarantino film, Django Unchained, the Germany bounty hunter, 
Dr. King Schulze, utters to the enslaved Django, “On one hand I despise slavery, on the 
other hand I need your help, if you’re not in a position to refuse, all the better.”44 
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Establishing the differences between ‘humanitarian’ and ‘imperial’ should mean 
clarifying the contradictions and reestablishing the vivid details of the past. Everill 
accomplishes this explanation, and in the process reveals “the ideological, nationalistic, 
and practical forces that precluded international co-operation” on a seemingly universal 
moral imperative to end not only the slave trade, but slavery.45 
While some scholars attempt to break the traditional molds that have taken hold 
of military humanitarianism and imperialism, others while not breaking tradition aid 
these scholars by creating new bibliographies in their works. While this point may seem 
trite, historians depend upon not only their research abilities, but of others in their shared 
discipline. One of these contributors is Joseph G. Dawson III. A history professor, 
Dawson took advantage of the innovative new U.S. frontier military studies that appeared 
during the latter half of the twentieth century and wrote The late 19th century U.S. Army, 
1865-1898: a research guide. Having specialized on the American military in the 
nineteenth century, Dawson felt it necessary to compile a simple, yet highly useful 
research guide based on the new study. This scholarship does not concern itself with the 
foreign humanitarian behavior that exists in the U.S. military between 1865 and 1898. 
Rather, it is interested in exposing researchers, students, and teachers to new thesis 
theories and points of view. Exposure to any new literature, no matter the scale, can 
revolutionize any field of research and alter how scholars as a whole view a subject. 
Following the Civil War, the U.S. military (namely the Army and Marine Corps) 
experienced an economic low point in its history; an experience that lasted decades until 
the onset of the Spanish-American War of 1898. During this period, the military found 
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itself forced to work within the constraints of limited funding, inadequate equipment, and 
a severely reduced force. Nevertheless, Congress and the public still held high 
expectations for the military to carry out its duties. These responsibilities included coastal 
defense, strike breaking, overseas protection of American citizens and goods, and 
garrison duty in the South during the Reconstruction Era. In addition, American settlers 
viewed the Native Americans in the West as a threat as they claimed new territories. This 
meant the military had to continue its age-old obligation of protecting the frontier for 
American settlers. Many of these tasks have not disappeared in the present. The U.S.  
Army Core of Engineers (USACE) still performs many of the functions today that it had 
over a century ago, such as repairing navigation channels.46 
Granting this compilation does not shed new light on American military history in 
terms of analysis, Dawson does manage to identify the primary military sources of this 
period in American history. This accomplishment will aid any scholar interested in either 
this era or subject matter. In addition to his preface, which lists the “top fifty secondary 
sources,” he categorizes source materials according to nine major topical sections that 
encompass secondary sources, government documents, published primary sources, and 
the location of important manuscript collections.47 Unfortunately, his extensive list of 
sources does omit many of the overlooked missions the U.S. military undertook during 
this time, such as the 1868 Operation Columbia. 
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Dawson provides several introductory essays to the major sections, all of which 
flow into the lists of sources fluidly and help provide a discussion to the general topics. 
Among these discussions are the major schools of thought concerning whether the officer 
corps was moving toward professionalism and how isolated the military was from 
American society. His concise annotations on major works, such as those by Robert M. 
Utley and Samuel P. Huntington, are of immense value to any student or scholar 
beginning to study this age. Unfortunately, this is not the same case for less significant 
works. In addition, he neglects to reference source locations for Edwin McMasters 
Stanton’s personal papers. Considering Stanton served as Secretary of War from January 
20, 1862 until May 28, 1868, it would have befitted Dawson to include the papers 
location. Despite these issues, Dawson’s work proves to be a well-balanced source of 
references to this period in the U.S. army’s history. Taken as a whole, it provides an 
excellent departure point for understanding the difficulties the army faced as it attempted 
to execute its multifaceted missions following the Civil War in American society. 
While an examination of the Atlantic slave trade reveals the American military’s 
nineteenth century involvement in humanitarian affairs, alone, it is not enough to show a 
consistent involvement in those affairs. Despite scholar’s efforts to expand beyond the 
abolition of the slave trade and the complex political situations created by nation-states 
and the groups within, their research has remained relatively stagnant. This stagnation or 
neglect is an opportunity for scholars. It creates an environment that depends upon better 
research, a dependency upon the inclusion of diverse resources. James Tertius de Kay, a 
naval historian and published author of children’s books, overcame this stagnation within 
his field of study, predominantly nineteenth century American naval history. While not 
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overly concerned with the U.S. Navy’s humanitarian efforts, his scholarly-reviewed 
research found in the Chronicles of the frigate Macedonian, 1809-1922 provides yet 
another example of American military FHA. 
Between 1845 and 1849, Ireland experienced the Great Famine, a period in which 
one million died and another million emigrated from the island. In terms of percentage, 
this equates to between 20% and 25%.48 During this time of hardship, the U.S. Navy 
became a participant in providing humanitarian assistance to the Irish and Scots through 
the use of two ships, the USS Macedonian and USS Jamestown.49 The Chronicles of the 
frigate Macedonian, 1809-1922 come to house this tale, but it does not represent the heart 
of the book. Like most nineteenth century military historians, the dedicated focus on 
either personnel or warships come at the cost of larger patterns, in de Kay’s case, this 
means FHA. The book chronicles the warship Macedonian, and the personalities who 
found themselves a part of it, from the time the ship was planned to the eventual 
destruction of its last timber. The first third of the book explains the ship’s service in the 
Royal Navy and its eventual capture by the American Navy during the War of 1812.50 
The remainder of de Kay’s research reveals the ship’s intimate history with FHA. From 
its inception into the U.S. navy in the first half of the nineteenth century to 1875, the 
Macedonian delivered supplies to those who were in desperate need of them. It also 
protected American economic interests and joined in the abolitionists fight against the 
Atlantic Slave Trade. 
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Figure 2. Painting of USS Jamestown by Ted Walker showing the return of the 
naval vessel to Boston Harbor after carrying supplies to Ireland. Taken from 
http://irishboston.blogspot.com/2010/05/may-16-1847-uss-jamestown-returns-
to.html 
Aside from the critical moments in the ship’s history, which contains archival 
research, this book is based mainly on an assortment of secondary accounts, an issue that 
can plague any research. Despite the entertaining and novel-like manner in which de Kay 
wrote, much of his story is, in fact, a stitching together of other’s research. The 
Chronicles of the Frigate Macedonian, 1809–1922 stands as both a valuable research tool 
in the historiography of the subject, as well as, a singular location for information on the 
Macedonian. 
It is important to remember that humanitarianism is merely a desire of one 
individual to help out another regardless of motivation. To label a military action or 
mission as humanitarian will inevitably lead to an argument; to make the suggestion that 
American military FHA began in the early nineteenth century possibly more so. With 
virtually no literature and research dedicated to American military FHA in this period, it 
begs to ask whether it exists or not. Although scholars have not devoted their attention to 
31 
 
 
this particular topic, they have helped to lay down a foundation for the idea. From the 
philosophical viewpoint of antislavery, the U.S. military slowly set sail toward the ocean 
with the humanitarian winds filling its sails. 
Concentration on 1950s Forward 
With vague definitions given by both scholars and governments, military 
humanitarian operations can be a delicate and frustrating subject to discuss. 
Unfortunately, much of the discussion revolves around whether these activities are a 
legitimate use of the military. In order to adequately trace back the history on U.S. 
military humanitarianism, it is essential to understand how scholars have defined it since 
the beginning of the Cold War. Although concerned with defining how and when to 
intervene, scholars have attempted to create a precise definition of what constitutes 
modern military humanitarian intervention that reveals a history dating back to the early 
nineteenth century. An attempt that has created the following description: humanitarian 
intervention is “military intervention across state borders for humanitarian purposes.”51 
Between groups of scholars, it is often debated as to when the American military 
began to pursue foreign humanitarianism. For some academics, the Spanish-American 
War of 1898 marks the beginning, and for others the Berlin Airlift following World War 
II provides the mark. Regardless of how correct either group is in the matter, both 
historians and political scientists find the post-World War II era contains some of the 
most well recorded examples of American foreign policy. All of these illustrations 
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prominently feature the use of armed forces intervening in the Third World.52 Some 
scholars, such as Glenn J. Antizzo, have gone so far as to make a list of rules, containing 
fifteen points, which he believes the U.S. should meet prior to deciding to intervene 
overseas militarily. Akin to Clausewitz’s admonitions, Antizzo includes such goals as 
active support from the public, military, and government, an avoidance of multilateral 
situations, and a willingness to use all powers necessary to accomplish the goal of the 
intervention.53 Lists of criteria, such as Antizzo’s, can hold a multitude of importance, of 
which the most important aspect may be the defined parameters for intervention. 
While scholars have ignored the larger history of the American military regarding 
foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA), their research has helped to pave the way for a 
deeper history to become unraveled and told. Foreign policy experts such as Richard N. 
Haass have come to see the post-cold war world as synonymous with military 
interventions, regional violence, and ethnic violence.54 The collapse of multinational-
states such as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia brought nationalism to the forefront of 
global politics.55 In addition, the growing influence of non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) has complicated the political situations in the post-Cold War order. Haass and 
scholars have produced an immense contribution to the academic and political worlds by 
carefully explaining how the changing sociopolitical landscape leads to changes in 
military intervention techniques. As the collapse of the Soviet Union led to greater U.S. 
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intervention globally, so too did the eventual collapse of the Spanish Empire in the 
nineteenth century. The emergence of multiple new world governments created a period 
of instability that when combined with the American belief in Manifest Destiny and the 
need to defend American liberty abroad resulted in a similar period of military 
interventionism. 
Ultimately, while Alexander Moseley and his fellow contributors create yet 
another foggy definition of humanitarian intervention, their primary concern is with 
presenting a different ideological and methodological point of view. An interpretation 
that the academic and political communities can adopt when examining military 
intervention. During their research, these scholars produced six specific questions in 
which to present their point of view. These six questions are: 
1. Are there genuinely universal human rights? 
2. Is military action a morally acceptable form of intervention? 
3. Can military intervention be justified selectively, or must it be consistently 
undertaken either in all comparable case or in none? 
4. Is military intervention in defence of human rights an illegitimate violation 
of the sovereignty of nation states? 
5. If the traditional picture of an international order based on sovereign 
nation state is questionable, what alternative conception of the 
international order might be preferable? 
6. Are there, then, other universal human values which might be invoked to 
justify humanitarian intervention?56 
The last question in particular suggests an interesting and somewhat provocative 
opening-up of what constitutes the wider values such as esthetic and cultural ones that are 
potentially worth defending with military force. 
                                                 
56 Moseley and Norman, “Introduction,” p. 8. 
34 
 
 
Aside from providing a clearer definition of humanitarian intervention, writers 
such as Andrew Natsios argue that the legitimacy of military intervention is a moot point. 
The United States holds a legitimate interest in leading the response to disasters, both 
natural and manmade.57 Providing aid to nations during their time of need, especially 
during natural disasters, stands to fulfill American civil society’s need to assist their 
fellow man, as well as protect American liberty abroad. In the 2005 Pakistan earthquake, 
U.S. military forces provided aid to the Pakistani government and people. While issues 
will always occur during these operations, such as the potential hoarding of supplies, the 
American government saw this as an opportunity to help stabilize Pakistan during a time 
of crisis.58 This opportunity promoted the American need to defend its liberty by 
stabilizing an ally of the United States. It also demonstrates how the U.S. Navy has been 
equipped to handle both wartime and humanitarian missions depending on the current 
situation. By being equipped to handle both situations, each at one end of the spectrum 
for levels of conflict, the Navy justifies both its existence and present size.59 A 
justification that can be seen made by both branches of the military, the Navy and the 
Army, in the early nineteenth century as they fought to hold onto their funding.  
Wars are complex events that prove difficult to label clearly. However, how 
nations and their leaders fight wars allows for their assessment as either moral or immoral 
to occur. In The Situational Ethics of Statecraft, Robert Jackson attempts to analyze a 
leader’s ability to conduct a moral, ethical war and his ability to judge a situation 
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consciously. He defines ethics of statecraft as a “task to bring ethical questions into 
contact with real situations.”60 This assessment of statecraft can be applied to situations 
outside of war when the use of military forces occurs, including but not limited to 
humanitarian operations both domestic and foreign. During domestic crises such as 
Hurricane Katrina or student protests, leaders must be able to judge a situation 
consciously and understand if the deployment of troops is necessary and how to use them 
effectively if they are. During instances such as Hurricane Katrina, it is important for the 
president to have the moral conviction to send in national troops as early as the situation 
deems it appropriate. A moment in time that a leader must not only be able to see but 
willing to seize even if it means stepping upon the toes of others to achieve. 
When a military intervenes, whether it is on its soil or that of other nations, it is 
never a black and white affair. Militaries exist within a gray zone. That is their existence 
cannot be placed in pure terms of good or bad. They exist for one primary reason, to 
protect their nation’s citizens and its constitution. Though they exist for that chief reason, 
a sense of order and infrastructure they bring with them wherever they go means leaders 
will find new reasons to justify their existence and the expenditure to maintain them. 
Although scholars often explore events that occur within their lifetime, or close to it, the 
definitions they create for concepts such as humanitarian intervention often expand the 
histories of the subjects they research. Although concerned with defining how and when 
to intervene, scholars have created a definition, although still vague, of what constitutes 
modern military humanitarian intervention that reveals a history dating back to the early 
nineteenth century. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BEHIND THE SCENES 
By understanding the notions and desires that have guided successive generations 
of American patriots and politicians, history holds the possibility of uncovering new 
kernels of knowledge previously overlooked. Since 1835, American scholars and 
European political thinkers, such as Alexis de Tocqueville, have been fascinated by the 
early Puritan settlers. Men and women who risked everything on the belief that a 
newfound and seemingly uncivilized land could offer a better life. This narrative of 
Puritans, and later of the Age of Enlightenment, have helped to create a belief that 
Americans are inherently different from their European counterparts. A mere credence 
which gave rise to the nation and people who believed, despite any of their hypocrisies, 
that the world could be made better for all of humanity. This seemingly simple notion 
would provide growth to political organizations such as the American Colonization 
Society and local abolitionists such as Abigail Adams.  These various societies, despite 
slaveholder’s typical domination of national politics, military officers, of both northern 
and southern heritage, would come to embody the altruistic ideologies that harken back to 
early American settlers. 
Analysis of 19th Century Altruistic/Abolitionist Ideologies 
The United States is a nation founded upon both aggressive expansionism and an 
overarching ideology of civilization, a basis that helped to give birth to a civil society 
imbued with egalitarian ideas that linked American liberty with the right to engage in 
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public activism. Taken from the European Age of Enlightenment, groups of Americans, 
such as the abolitionists, took both their beliefs in civil activism and their altruism to help 
form the foundation for humanitarianism in American foreign policy. With a new 
democracy born from the philosophies of John Locke, Thomas Hobbes, and others, the 
United States quickly became an interventionist state whose political and economic 
desires mixed with their civic activism. 
Altruism has held many definitions since Auguste Comte, a sociologist and 
philosopher of science, first coined the term in the mid-nineteenth century. Perhaps the 
most well-known explanation is that altruism is the principle or practice of concern for 
the welfare of others. While this definition is modest, it makes the concept of altruism too 
broadly defined without allowing for knowledge of the two sub-types of altruism. These 
two subtypes are vested interests and reciprocal altruism. 
Vested interests altruism is as simple as it sounds. If an individual’s allies, friends, 
or similar social in-groups either suffer or disappear, said person is likely to experience 
the same fate, as well.61 It is in the long-term interest of the individual to undertake noble 
actions, and this may include an extreme deed such as self-sacrifice. When the in-group is 
threatened by a hostile out-group, vested interests may guide an individual to choose the 
group over oneself. In addition, pure altruistic acts may make members of the in-group 
more cooperative and may lead to reciprocal altruism. 
Reciprocal altruism falls into two categories: direct and indirect. Direct 
reciprocity is a tit-for-tat strategy, in which one selfless act begets another direct 
charitable act. It promotes cooperation between individuals or organizations. A 
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consequence of this philanthropic approach is that people are only more likely to be 
cooperative if they are interacting with the same altruistic person again in the future. This 
level of interaction also increases as levels of communications do. Greater 
communication between two parties can lead to a gradual building of trust that may allow 
one party to express a need for more extensive help.62 An example within the military 
would be the Navy’s willingness to help fight fires on foreign soil. During these moments 
of crises, the regional ruler or governor may communicate a need for aid that the U.S. 
Navy sees as an opportunity to both strengthen ties with the local people and provide 
support with its resources. Indirect reciprocity, on the other hand, lacks personal 
connection and relationship and instead is built upon the reputation of an individual. If an 
individual holds a good reputation for reciprocity, there is a higher chance they may 
receive help from others at no direct cost to them. 
American altruism holds a complicated history, especially in concerns to its 
origin. In Democracy in America, Tocqueville wrote, “I think I can see the whole destiny 
of America contained in the first Puritan who landed on those shores.”63 Following in 
Tocqueville’s predilection has led some scholars to name John Winthrop as the first 
American Puritan because he led the first large wave of migrant Puritans to the New 
World. This assumption may be wrong; a stronger candidate is Roger Williams. 
Williams, banished by Winthrop from the Massachusetts Bay Colony, and founder of 
Providence and the Rhode Island Colony, holds the key to understanding the United 
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States and the American people found within the nation. Upset over Winthrop’s “city 
upon a hill,” Williams found his banishment to be both a curse and a blessing. Forced out 
of the Massachusetts Bay in January of 1636, Williams most likely would not have 
survived the winter on his own. Fortunately, his previous altruistic relationship with the 
Native Americans of the region led to his seemingly unlikely survival. Of the experience, 
he wrote, 
Boast not, proud English, of thy birth and blood, 
Thy brother Indian is by birth as good. 
Of one blood God made him and thee and all, 
As wise, as fair, as strong, as personal. 
 
By nature, wrath's his portion, thine no more, 
Till grace his soul and thine restore. 
Make sure thy second birth, else thou shalt see 
Heaven open to Indians wild, but shut to thee.64 
Aside from his egalitarian relationship with the native population, an important 
aspect Williams carried with him laid within his Baptist religion. 
Despite being a distinct minority religion in seventeenth-century New England, 
they, along with other sectarian Protestants, went on to become a majority in the 
American religious culture by the nineteenth century. Seymour Martin Lipset, a political 
sociologist, made the remark, “we are the only North Atlantic society whose predominant 
religious tradition is sectarian rather than an established church.”65 This enormously 
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important detail about American culture helps to provide a historical foundation, in part, 
as to why society appears to be so hospitable to the ideology of multiculturalism. 
Though many Americans expectations now fundamentally include a sense of 
fairness and decency, especially in a multicultural nation, this expectation once existed as 
a desire. A longing born from the flames of religious persecution, enslavement, and 
gender and political inequality. A yearning that gave rise to ideas and beliefs that every 
man should be born free and with the knowledge that they have liberty. From these 
flames emerged movements like abolitionism. 
At its most fundamental roots, abolitionism was a historical movement meant to 
end the African slave trade and liberate slaves. According to James McPherson, a 
historian, an abolitionist was an individual “who before the Civil War had agitated for the 
immediate, unconditional, and total abolition of slavery in the United States.”66 This 
strict definition of abolitionism excludes antislavery activists, such as Abraham Lincoln, 
who called for the gradual ending of slavery. Although abolitionists did not represent the 
majority of the American population, both prior to and after the American Revolution, 
they played a pivotal role in using the U.S. military for foreign humanitarian assistance. 
Often abolitionism is traced backed to the eighteenth century in America, when, 
during the First Great Awakening, abolitionism became a part of the evangelical and 
revitalization movement. Prior to this awakening though, the abolition movement against 
slavery holds much older roots in North America. In the seventeenth century, several 
British colonists, such as Roger Williams, emerged to challenge what they perceived to 
be an immoral and illegal system. These individuals, who supported some concept of 
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abolitionism, found legal ways to oppose the institution of slavery openly within their 
colony. From Pennsylvania to Georgia, the likes of James Edward Oglethorpe and others 
banned slavery on humanistic grounds.67 Upon earning its freedom from England in 1783 
at the end of the American Revolutionary War, the newly independent nation known as 
the United States of America would slowly pass antislavery legislation. These laws 
would not only bring an end to not only slavery in mostly northern states, but the U.S.’s 
legal participation in the Atlantic slave trade as well. 
In 1787, delegates at the U.S. Constitutional Convention held heated debates over 
slavery. This convention produced an agreement that provided for the protection of the 
international slave trade for twenty years, when in 1808 the United States criminalized 
the African Slave Trade.68 This twenty-year period allowed each state to pass laws that 
either abolished or severely limited the buying and selling of slaves on the international 
market. Prior to the 1808 ban, President Thomas Jefferson declared in 1806 that the 
nation needed to “withdraw the citizens of the United States from all further participation 
in those violations of human rights...which the morality, the reputation, and the best of 
our country have long been eager to proscribe.”69 The criminalization of the international 
slave trade reduced over ninety percent in the volume of slaves brought into the United 
States. Though the Atlantic Slave Trade had been made illegal, abolitionists still found 
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themselves confronted by a myriad of problems. Besides an active domestic slave trade to 
handle, they also needed to find a solution as to how deal with a freed people.  
From the seventeenth century through the nineteenth century, Americans, both 
before and after the Revolutionary War, found ways to help the enslaved. These solutions 
ranged from advocating individual acts of manumission to leading groups of armed men 
on raids with the goal of liberating as many men, women, and children as possible. 
Advocate groups, such as the Quakers or Moravians, managed to persuade copious 
amounts of slaveholders in the Upper South to free their slaves after 1776. Of all the 
property owners to free their slaves in acts of manumission, Robert Carter III of Virginia 
stands out as the most notable. In 1791, he released more than 450 people, the most 
slaves ever freed by an American.70 Others, such as John Brown in 1859, would use acts 
of terrorism in their quest to end slavery. David S. Reynolds, an American historian, 
credits Brown as the man “who killed slavery, sparked the civil war, and seeded civil 
rights.”71 
While many groups eventually called for the abolishment of slavery, the Quakers, 
a Christian-based group also known as the Society of Friends, became the first in the 
New World. In 1688, Germantown Quakers wrote a petition against slavery that was 
unusually clear and forceful in its argument against the institution. It helped to light the 
spirit that led to the end of slavery not only in the Society of Friends (1776), but in 
Pennsylvania (1780), as well.72 While groups such as the Quakers may not have 
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advocated the use of military force in regards to slavery, future actions of its members 
would help to establish the use of the federal army for foreign humanitarian assistance. 
Their support to emigrate freed slaves back to Africa would lead to other abolitionists 
calling for the U.S. Navy to support these ships as they made the perilous journey back to 
their ancestral homeland. 
The Quaker’s hardline stance against slavery also meant they represented but one 
end of the political spectrum. Those who opposed abolition would work just as hard in 
order to maintain the institution of slavery, as well as attempt to expand it if possible. As 
decades passed in the United States, these stances would not only become more ingrained 
in the lives of Americans, but eventually lead to the Civil War. In this war, Americans, 
fighting one another over political and social ideologies, would decide the fate of all 
those enslaved in the United States. 
Continuing the tradition set by the Quakers, political abolitionists proved to hold 
some amount of political influence in both slavery and military foreign humanitarianism 
from the early founding’s of various North American English colonies through the 
American Civil War. Aside from playing a role in the Pequot War in which he protested 
the enslavement of captives, Roger Williams also helped to create the first law abolishing 
African slavery in 1652. Instead of allowing slavery to take place in the providence of 
Rhode Island, Williams abolished slavery and replaced it with a system of indentured 
servitude.73 While he intended the bondage to act similar to that found in Europe, with a 
limit indentured servitude of no more than ten years, his law proved futile. Not only was 
it never enforced in Rhode Island, as the demand for cheap labor prevailed, the future 
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American state became a corner of the “triangular trade.”74 Sugar and molasses from 
Rhode Island went to the Caribbean where it became rum. From there it went to West 
Africa in exchange for slaves and then back to Rhode Island as the process repeated itself 
over and over. 
Politically charged abolitionists in the New World did not end at Williams. 
Centuries after his forgotten 1652 slavery ban, others, such as Thomas Jefferson, 
Abraham Lincoln, and Henry B. Stanton would carry the fight for abolition forward. In 
the case of Jefferson and his later predecessor James Monroe, the U.S. Navy would find 
itself fighting pirates in the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea for economic, 
political, and humanitarian reasons.  
The politics within a nation, often driven by economic and social ideologies, drive 
militaries to participate in foreign humanitarian causes. Founded upon both aggressive 
expansion and an overarching ideology of civilization, the United States began as a 
nation imbued with egalitarian views that linked a strong sense of liberty with the right to 
engage in civic activism. Emerging liberal nineteenth century notions, born from the 
philosophies of Locke, Hobbes, and others mixed with economic desires that drove 
Americans to expand beyond their mainland. These diverse desires led to Americans 
expanding their sense of altruistic aid to others throughout the globe and establishing 
American military FHA in the nineteenth century. 
The Southern Impact 
At the end of the day, the U.S. Africa Squadron proved inefficient at capturing 
slavers. This apparent ineptitude has led some scholars, such as Peter Mendy, to question 
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the diligence of southern naval commanders in the squadron. This line of thinking, then, 
places the entirety of the blame on the pro-slavery attitude the commanders may have 
carried with them. In this regard, statistics developed by J. Scott Harmon in his research 
on the Navy and the slave trade help to reveal a fuller truth. Harmon’s analysis included 
seventy-one officers, who hailed from the North, South, and border states, and which 
included the West Indies and Brazil squadrons.75 He concluded that,  
40.7 percent of the Southern officers, 25 percent of border state officers, and 46.8 
percent of Northern state officers made captures, and that the average of all three 
was 40.7 percent—the same as that for southern officers alone. Also in terms of 
percentage of captures per officer, the Southern officers were more efficient at .85 
per officer, as opposed to .75 for Northern officers.76 
John N. Maffitt, a southern naval officer, held the highest capture rate for slavers 
in any of the squadrons. Stationed aboard the Dolphin in the West Indies from 1858 to 
1861, Maffitt captured five slavers.77 During the Civil War, this same man would become 
the commander of the Florida, a Confederate cruiser. Given these statistics, it does not 
appear blame for the squadron’s inefficiency can be placed squarely across the board on 
the naval officers of the ships, or even on the unit commanders. 
Therefore, if the officers are not to blame, then the incompetence of the squadron 
lies within the tools—i.e., sailing ships instead of steamers and a lack of more 
appropriately placed squadron depots. This obligation, then falls higher up than that of a 
squadron commander. In the nineteenth century, there existed but one superior in the 
Navy Department, the secretary of Navy himself. 
                                                 
75 Canney, African Squadron, p. 224. 
76 Warren S. Howard, American Slavers and the Federal Law, 1837–1862 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1963), pp. 219–23. 
77 Canney, African Squadron, p. 224 
46 
 
 
Since the squadrons began in 1819, the commanders and flag officers of the ships 
consistently reiterated the need to rectify those two issues. During the first decade, 
secretaries promised these commanders the addition of steamers, a promise never carried 
through. It is important to note that, on occasion, these secretaries of Navy wrote of these 
needs in their annual reports. In general, many of these requests were for Congressional 
appropriations to build small vessels and steamers. However, by the Mexican-American 
War in the 1840s, not only did the Navy possess a number of steamers, but they had 
proven themselves immensely useful in various combat operations. Until the end of their 
operation in 1861, the Africa Squadron never bore witness to one. 
As a matter of fact, every naval squadron held a demand for the small steamers. 
There stood only one man who determined the priorities in a ship’s assignment, the 
Secretary of Navy. With the continuation of inadequate vessels and supplies, the Africa 
Squadron found itself near or at the bottom of the secretary’s list. 
Of all the squadrons that existed at the point in time, the Africa Squadron “was 
the only one founded with a specific, congressional mandated mission.”78 Not only was it 
the only group required to maintain a quasi-blockade on a foreign soil, it was also the 
only unit whose objective never changed. Other naval squadron’s objectives were in a 
state of constant flux according to whichever port city they arrived in during their 
peacetime circuits. 
Of course, there is the argument of the high cost required to maintain steamers in 
foreign stations. However, the Navy did manage to sustain steamers in other foreign 
stations, and these units did not hold the obligation of apprehending criminals. The 
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problem did not lie in adding ships to the Navy’s inventory to use them off Africa. The 
problem lay in reassigning available vessels that not only satisfied the Webster-
Ashburton Treaty of 1842 but met the demands the Navy faced elsewhere. 
As for the locations of the squadron bases, it is important to know that serious 
discussions over relocating the depots occurred off and on during the existence of the 
unit. Furthermore, after the preliminary health issues, especially in 1843-44, an unhealthy 
climate became less and less of a factor for the western coast of Africa. For other nations, 
primarily the British Empire, health issues did not prevent the establishment of an 
extensive network of depot facilities along the coast of the continent. In fact, when the 
American Navy finally moved one of their depots in 1859, health issues were never 
mentioned in any report. As for the cost of the stations, the actual warehouse structures 
located at St. Paul de Loando only cost the Navy $800. The only remaining costs came 
from leasing and the moving of materials from Porto Praya to Loando.79 
Concerning the secretaries of the Navy during this era, of the eighteen who held 
the office during this period, ten were from the slaveholding states of North Carolina, 
Maryland, and Virginia. These Southern secretaries controlled the Navy for thirty of the 
forty-two years the squadron existed.80 The few Northerner’s who held the office, such as 
David Henshaw and George Bancroft, did not hold the office long enough to make any 
significant impact on policy. 
In general, these secretaries, regardless of where they come from, simply 
neglected the Africa Squadron. Aside from the initial instructions given to the first 
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commander, Matthew Perry, the Secretaries of Navy participated in very little 
correspondence with the commanding officers. Those first orders were repeated nearly 
verbatim to each successive flag officer.81 As time passed, and the Webster-Ashburton 
Treaty occurred, the secretaries, beginning with Abel Upshur, inverted the mission of the 
unit. Where emphasis once existed on the suppression of the slave trade, it slowly shifted 
to trade and commerce protection. In fact, historians, such as Mark T. Haggard, have 
made the argument that by 1842, the fleet appeared to have existed merely as a means to 
protect American merchantmen from the British.82 Lastly, the secretaries, early on, 
emphasized the strong need for the group to patrol the northwest African coast. This area 
of Africa, arguably held a lesser number of slavers than other portions of the African 
coastal region. Had the commanding officers within the squadron not strayed from that 
directive, the group would have achieved even less. 
It would be foolish to think that the secretaries of the Navy bore the sole 
responsibility for obstructing the suppression of the slave trade. Many southern public 
officials, such as consul-generals, did not purposely set out to aid slavers. Instead, their 
mixed feelings toward slavery and hatred of the British led them down a path of 
necessary evil. As a consul-general in Cuba, Nicholas Trist became one of many who 
believed that the institution of slavery had to exist, despite it being a “blight on the 
democratic society of the United States.”83 Like Thomas Jefferson, Trist personally 
opposed slavery, but he held the practice to be humane. By enslaving dark-skinned 
Africans and placing them under the firm hand of a white Christian male, they delivered 
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them from a life of paganism.84 As long as dark-skinned Africans lacked the supposed 
intelligence and morality of their light-skinned counterparts, Trist, and others like him, 
would allow their humanitarian and anti-British beliefs to guide their actions. An 
outcome that would produce support for domestic slavery, while at the same time 
creating opposition to the international slave trade. 
If his feelings toward slavery could be called mixed, Trist’s hatred toward the 
British was nothing but clear. As an American nationalist, he not only came to resent the 
British, but assumed their every action threatened American sovereignty. Although the 
British claimed to be suppressing the Atlantic slave trade, Trist, along with the American 
government felt they had overstepped their rights under the Law of Nations. In one of his 
reports, Trist stated that the British suppression of the slave trade was merely “mock 
humanitarianism.”85 These feelings and beliefs led Trist to form a relationship with the 
Spanish Captain-General of Cuba, a known criminal who profited from every slave he 
allowed to disembark from Havana.86 Despite Trist’s great reluctance to pry into the 
cargo manifests of the ships he signed-off on, he did succeed in curbing direct American 
participation in the slave trade. His hatred toward the British pushed him to suggest 
stricter legal requirements that made it more difficult for slavers to gain access to 
American ships. He also became a proponent for the United States to use its own Navy to 
suppress the trade in an effort to prevent the British from assuming a greater degree of 
authority over American ships.87 
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The United States has always had a complicated relationship with slavery, a 
relationship the Africa Squadron shows in its entirety. While southern politics may have 
hampered the success by the United States to suppress the Atlantic slave trade, 
individuals who came from that region proved to be unexpected allies. Naval captains, 
such as Maffitt, who later served in the Confederate navy, became a shining example as 
he captured the greatest number of slavers. While the South may have held a strong grasp 
on the national stage of politics, it did not, and could not, control every southerner. 
Individuals from this area, such as Maffitt and Trist, demonstrate how even those who 
believed in slavery in America could find justification to help any man, woman, or child 
regardless of race. 
Types of Foreign Humanitarianism 
Since the end of World War II, academics such as David Scheffer and James 
Pattison have demonstrated the United States military’s participation in humanitarian 
assistance and intervention missions. A topic scholars continue to argue is whether or not 
it is the place of the military to be actively used in humanitarian crises. While this 
argument ensues, it is important to understand not only what humanitarian assistance is in 
general, but what it encompasses, as well. By understanding how the United States uses 
its military to pursue humanitarian objectives in the present, it becomes easier to define 
and extend beyond the end of World War II or the Spanish-American War of 1898. 
Humanitarian aid has been defined by scholars countless times and from these 
explanations have emerged basic principles. In particular, humanitarian assistance is 
governed by codes of humanity, impartiality, and independence. It is intended to act as 
short-term support, but difficulties can arise in defining when the aftermath of an 
51 
 
 
emergency ends, and other types of assistance begin. This difficulty is especially true in 
periods of prolonged vulnerability. Traditionally, humanitarian responses include, but are 
not limited to: 
• Emergency food aid (short-term distribution and supplemental programs) 
• Material relief services and assistance (medicines, shelter, food, etc…) 
• Support and protection services, relief coordination (logistics, 
communications, and coordination) 
• Rehabilitation and reconstruction (repairing pre-existing infrastructure) 
• And, disaster prevention and preparedness. 
The U.S. military is one of the few organizations in the history of the United 
States that has held the ability to be deployed rapidly in order to carry out humanitarian 
assistance, domestically or globally.  
The classic example of U.S. military FHA is the Berlin airlift during the Berlin 
Blockade. Considered one of the first major international crises of the Cold War, the 
United States and its western allies organized an airlift to carry supplies to the people of 
West Berlin.88 The Soviet Union had blocked all ground access to West Berlin for the 
Western Allies beginning in June of 1948. The aim of this blockade for the Soviets was 
to gain a higher level of control over all of Berlin, making the entire city dependent upon 
the Soviet government for food, fuel, and aid. For nearly one year, the beleaguered 
Berliners of West Berlin came to depend upon the airlift. Not only did it eventually force 
the Soviets to lift the blockade in May 1949, but demonstrated to the world that the U.S. 
military could be used to make a difference through FHA. 
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For the last sixty-six years, the modern history of U.S. military FHA has 
continued to grow, and with it what humanitarian assistance encompasses for the 
military. From airlifts to tsunamis and fires, the U.S., as well as other nations, have come 
to expect military action after moments of crisis. On March 11, 2012, a 9.0 magnitude 
earthquake struck the nation of Japan. This earthquake not only led to a tsunami, but the 
subsequent earthquake damage led to cooling system failures in the Fukushima Dai-Ichi 
nuclear plant. Over 19,000 victims were either lost or reported missing.89 In response, 
President Barack Obama, the American Commander-in-Chief, initiated Operation 
Tomodachi, the single, largest bilateral operation with Japan ever. This act entailed the 
deployment of “24,000 Department of Defense (DoD) personnel, 190 aircraft, and 24 
Navy ships supporting humanitarian and disaster relief efforts.”90 Americans are often 
quick to offer up some form of altruistic aid. This instinct dates back prior to the 
existence of the United States, when Americans belonged to the British or other European 
empires. For the U.S. military, this use of its resources also holds an older date than the 
twentieth century. 
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Figure 3. U.S. armed force member looking at destruction of 9.0 magnitude 
earthquake in Sendai, Japan. Taken from 
http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=121 
The Berlin Airlift and Operation Tomodachi represent but one part of modern 
FHA for the U.S. military. For Americans, as well as much of the West, humanitarian 
assistance has often included humanitarian interventions, as well as peacekeeping. While 
these practices both date back to pre-Cold War eras, understanding the current use of 
both helps in dating their histories. Quite simply, peacekeeping is the act of creating 
conditions that favor a long-lasting peace. Humanitarian intervention, which often 
includes peacekeeping, is the act of using military force against another state when the 
primary declared objective is ending human rights violations being “perpetrated by the 
state in which it is directed.”91 
The intervention of one state by another on humanitarian grounds has been in 
discussion of public international law since the nineteenth century. Possibly the first 
example of this action can be seen in the Greek War of Independence that occurred in the 
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first half of the century. In 1827, Great Britain, Russia, and France decisively intervened 
upon the behalf of Greek freedom fighters helping to secure Greek independence from 
the Ottoman Empire.92 For modern United States history, the first case of humanitarian 
intervention is seen in the Spanish-American War of 1898. Similar to the Greek War of 
Independence, many Americans came to see the Spanish as a source of human rights 
violation on the island, with their use of concentration camps. The valiant Cuban people 
needed help from a protectorate state. In addition, any American citizen who came near 
Spanish possession in the Caribbean may be in danger of losing both their liberty and 
lives to a tyrannical empire.93 This need to protect both their citizens abroad, as well as 
fellow North Americans, comes to help demonstrate the way in which the United States 
had come to view its role in the world by 1898. A vision held by longer historical roots. 
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Figure 4. Victims of the Spanish reconcentration camps. Taken from 
http://spanishamericanwar.info/causes.htm 
While the United States has involved itself in many examples of humanitarian 
intervention since the Spanish-America War, one of the most recent examples is the 2011 
military intervention in Libya. Codenamed Operation Unified Protector was not only 
multilateral but demonstrated how these acts of intervention can be limited to blockades. 
Concerned that Muammar Gaddafi, the then-current leader of Libya, had conducted 
airstrikes against Libyan rebels during the Libya civil war, members of the United 
Nations, including the United States, passed Security Council Resolution 1973. The 
intent of this resolution was to create “an immediate ceasefire in Libya, including an end 
to the current attacks against civilians, which it said might constitute crimes against 
humanity ... imposing a ban on all flights in the country’s airspace — a no-fly zone — 
and tightened sanctions on the Qadhafi regime and its supporters.”94 Human rights 
                                                 
94 United Nations Security Council, “Security Council Approves ‘No-Fly Zone’ over Libya, Authorizing 
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violations have continued to act as a source spurring on American involvement. Like 
providing humanitarian assistance, this use of U.S. military resources holds an older 
history than that of the late nineteenth century. 
Sometimes, in order to understand the history of the United States, it is first easier 
to come to understand the present.  For American’s involvement in FHA, especially that 
of the military’s, this is true. Understanding not only how Americans have used military 
resources in FHA, but why as well reveals a part of American civil society’s character 
that can be seen dating back to the eighteenth century. Though the past may lie forgotten 
in the present, its roots are always visible. 
Analysis of Modern Federal Legislation 
The military’s role in the United States has not existed without definition of its 
role. Since 1956, Title 10 of the United States Code has outlined the role of the armed 
forces and provided the legal basis for the missions, roles, and organization of each 
service, as well as the Department of Defense. In addition, Title 22 of the U.S. Code has 
also helped to outline the role of foreign relations and intercourse. When examined 
together, these two titles show the validity required to have the military conduct FHA.  
U.S.C. Title 10 & 22 
Aside from defining the general role of the armed forces in the United States, 
Title 10 includes five subtitles. Each of these subtitles deals with a separate component of 
the armed service and are: (A) General Military Law, (B) Army, (C) Navy and Marine 
Corps, (D) Air Force, and (E) Reserve Components. Title 22, on the other hand, contains 
eighty-six chapters, including multiple subchapters and topics range from Cuban 
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Democracy to Foreign Wars, War Materials, and Neutrality. These two titles are not only 
necessary and important function of government regarding the provision of security, but 
are the foundation for U.S. national security and foreign policy.  Together these titles 
govern national security, U.S. armed forces, Department of State, and public diplomacy 
efforts. The United States Code is intricate, expansive, and dynamic. Continually finding 
parts of it amended, repealed, and reviewed as necessary. By understanding how these 
titles of the U.S. Code work together, it is easier to understand how the federal 
government has come to deploy modern military resources. 
While every aspect of Title 10 is necessary, in regards to FHA, Chapter 20 is 
paramount. Chapter 20, entitled Humanitarian and Other Assistance, details how the 
armed forces are to handle situations from international disaster assistance to the training 
of foreign personnel. Most importantly, Chapter 20 “authorizes US Armed Forces to 
provide humanitarian and other assistance alongside authorized military operations under 
the proscription of the Secretary of Defense.”95 For instance, Section 402 of Chapter 20 
deals with the transportation of humanitarian relief supplies to foreign countries. While 
the current Title 10 is an amalgamation of Title 10 and Title 34 (both existing as separate 
titles prior to 1956), its historical basis can be seen in events such as the Berlin Airlift or 
the 1847 Ireland foodstuffs aid. 
While Title 10, Chapter 20 of the U.S.C. may outline the armed forces role in 
humanitarian matters, Chapter 9, Subchapter I (War Materials) of Title 22 provides 
                                                 
95 U.S. Government Printing Office, “Chapter 20—Humanitarian and Other Assistance,” U.S. Office of the 
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relevant definitions that concern international relations. Section 408a of the subchapter 
states, “The term “United States” as used in this Act includes the Canal Zone and all 
territory and waters, continental or insular, subject to the jurisdiction of the United 
States.”96 This defined definition of the United States, in terms of authority, helps to set 
clear boundaries as to where the U.S. may stop the illegal exportation of war materials 
while not interfering with foreign trade. Preventing the illegal exportation of war 
materials, precisely using military resources, can be viewed as a humanitarian action. By 
not allowing human-rights violation states from receiving war materials, among others, 
the Title 22, Chapter 9 is helping the U.S. to carry out FHA that may prevent the need for 
further exertion of national resources. Aside from the potential to conserve valuable 
resources, Title 22 holds a historical connection like Title 10, as well.  
One of the most significant historical connections that exist between either Title 
10 or 22 is the protection of citizens abroad. While this particular connection can be 
easily seen in Title 22, Chapter 23 (Protection to Naturalized Citizens Abroad), both 
titles still provide for the protection of citizens abroad in some form. This protection can 
come about from FHA as previously stated in Title 10, Chapter 20, Section 408. When 
the U.S. trains foreign personnel, rather it is from nation rebuilding or altruistic 
intentions, both states benefit from assisting one another. Although the United States has 
not always received benefits from FHA, the armed forces have developed doctrine and 
technique publications, built upon a long history of humanitarian action, that guide 
modern FHA operations. 
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From its first steps as a free nation, the United States stumbled toward granting 
freedom to all. Although the citizens of this free state held biases, the society they had 
created held the inherent belief that, “…all men are created equal; that they are endowed 
by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the 
pursuit of happiness.”97 This belief, along with expansionistic tendency’s, would launch 
many Americans to confront the wrongs of the world, injustices such as slavery, 
inequality, and threats to self-liberty. These strong beliefs and confrontational tendencies 
would eventually lead to the development of legislation that governed the role of these 
military assistance operations. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 19TH CENTURY MILITARY FOREIGN HUMANITARIANISM 
Suppression of the Atlantic Slave Trade 
1819 African Slave Trade Patrol 
The year 1819 marks both the creation of the United States African Slave Trade 
Patrol and the involvement of the American military in foreign humanitarianism, neither 
events were born from spontaneous action. Indeed, the first attempt to suppress the 
importation of slaves into the new nation can be traced to the writing of the Constitution 
in 1787. Prior to this momentous occasion, the Articles of Confederation, the United 
States first constitution, only approached the matter with concern to fugitive slaves. The 
ordinance in this first constitution allowed unclaimed slaves to gain their freedom so long 
as they were captured at sea and below the high-water mark.98 The high-water mark 
represents the highest reached point by a body of water over land. 
Those attending the Constitutional Convention did not attempt to feign ignorance 
for the fact that slavery had become nearly sacrosanct within the southern states. In the 
era prior to the invention of the cotton gin, many American politicians agreed that slavery 
represented a necessary evil, which would gradually disappear due to economic 
pressures. With that premise in mind, slaveholding representatives were loath to object to 
any northern desires to create a particular target-date for the abolishment of the trade 
itself. Eventually, both sides reached a compromise, whereby 1808 became the set date 
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for the end of the legal importation of “such persons as any of the States now existing 
shall think proper to admit.”99 It is noteworthy to include that by 1788, all the states south 
to, and including, Virginia had outright banned the trade.100 Also, striking is the fact that 
this particular bill at the Constitutional Convention was the world’s first anti-slave trade 
legislation. Its date of entry into force only fell one year after Parliament banned the slave 
trade throughout the British Empire. 
During the interval, the slave trade continued to flourish throughout the United 
States, including the illegal transportation into states that passed their legislative bans on 
the trade. When combined with the trepidation caused by the violent slave revolt in Haiti, 
this illicit activity prompted increased agitation for greater regulations on various aspects 
of slavery. Among the most prominent of voices in this choir were the Quakers and 
Benjamin Franklin. In 1794, as a result of this, a new slave-trade law provided for heavy 
financial fines, as well as forfeiture of all vessels involved in the slave trade to any 
foreign nation. Quite naturally, any American or foreign citizen either fitting or preparing 
a ship for such trade or even transporting persons “for the purpose of selling them as 
slaves” found themselves in violation of this statute.101 Unfortunately, this piece of 
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legislation held a significant flaw. With the absence of any enforcement mechanism, this 
law relied upon individuals to be willing to bring charges against their fellow man. 
By 1800, Congress proved able to remedy this situation with a piece of legislation 
that not only added imprisonment to monetary penalties, but authorized the American 
Navy to seize the ships as prizes. In addition, it also made liable for persecution any 
individual who held any interest, “direct or indirect,” in the slaving voyage.102 
Unfortunately, like its predecessor, this piece of legislation neglected to address the 
disposition of slaves who found themselves freed during the enforcement of the law.  
The Quasi-War with France, an undeclared war fought mainly at sea between 
1798 and 1800, helped to provide the first venue for the U.S. Navy to enforce anti-slave 
trade legislation. Early on, the Navy had merely served to funnel information to the U.S. 
Treasury Department on ships they suspected participated in the trade. The Treasury 
Department initially held the responsibility for the prevention of smuggling. This duty 
made them the default government agency responsible for the suppression of the slave 
trade within the boundaries of the United States, via its harbors and coastlines. The 
Treasury’s Revenue Marine proved to be the department’s means in upholding this 
responsibility. However, the severe limitations of the force drastically reduced their 
efficacy. Never numbering greater than seventeen ships at its war peak in 1801, and with 
none any larger than a topsail schooner, Congress naturally looked toward the American 
navy as a solution.103 
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For example, in mid-1799, the current Secretary of the Treasury, Oliver Wolcott, 
wrote the customs collector in Boston: “…Captain Decatur of the Navy during his late 
cruise near Cuba, met with the Brig Dolphin of Boston William White Master with 140 
or 150 slaves for sale procured on the coast of Africa.”104 Wolcott preceded to direct the 
collector to “take requisite measures to enforce the law.”105 The following year, in April 
1800, the secretary of the Navy sent the treasury secretary a short list. This parchment 
contained a list of suspected slavers who had successfully returned from Cuba to 
Philadelphia.106 Despite any attempt to stem the slave trade, the Treasury Department 
proved most useful at cataloging the Navy’s reports of suspected slavers. 
During all of this, the U.S. Consul in Paramaribo, Surinam, felt compelled to 
write of the attractions of the trade in the Spanish West Indies. In his letters, he wrote, “It 
is well known that the Spanish Governors in the W.I. will admit any Neutral to land 
almost any cargo in their Ports—if the vessel brings 4 or 5 slaves. The profits of their 
trade is so alluring…few people in Trade would scruple or hesitate to adopt such a plan to 
gain admittance to a Spanish Port.”107 Furthermore, he opined that the “criminality of it 
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consists exclusively in the inhuman treatment of the Slaves” and likened it to transporting 
an “Irishmen…and selling him for a season.”108 
Having gained the ability to capture vessels in 1800, the Navy did not hesitate to 
use this newly found strength. It quickly began to seize any vessel suspected of slavery 
and sent them in for judgment. Lieutenant William Maley, the commander of the U.S. 
schooner Experiment, holds the honor of capturing the first slave-trading ship. While 
patrolling waters off of Cuba, Maley captured the sloop Betsey, a slave ship under the 
command of Captain Bateman Munro of Charleston. Aboard the ship, Maley found 
eighty-five slaves, all from Rio Pongo, Africa.109 
The capture of Betsy set off an uproar back in the States. Samuel Hodgson, a 
military intendant, wrote to former Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, “Captain Maley 
has arrived, he has acquit himself so as to meet the applause of all his last act the capture 
of a vessel from Charleston…with eighty five slaves…” Hodgson then went on to raise 
the issue of disposition for the recently freedman, “…to be sold they cannot, both 
Constitution and Law forbid this—what then is to be done—liberated where they are or 
indeed any where else they cannot be for no Government would allow it—the only 
alternative is to return them to their own Country…will it make the condition of the 
slaves any better? But Maley has done right in making the capture…a great indignation is 
already excited against the monsters that planned the voyage…”110 Shortly thereafter, the 
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ship itself was not only condemned but sold at Charleston in October of that same 
year.111  
Despite the Navy’s newfound ability to involve itself directly in matters involving 
both economic and humanitarian concerns, it found its success in stemming the slave 
trade short lived. By March of 1807, Congress had successfully passed the final piece of 
legislation that allowed for the enforcement of the 1808 slave trade ban. In addition to 
imprisonment, fines, and the forfeiture of any vessels involved, Congressional members 
included an additional $800 per slave fine that applied to any individual who purchased 
illicit freed slaves. In terms of enforcement, Congress authorized the President “to cause 
any of the armed vessels of the United States to be manned and employed” against 
American vessels trading in slaves on the high seas.112 It also approved the use of prize 
money, an additional incentive for both the Navy and Revenue Marines. However, 
Congress did not direct the Navy to institute any enforcement unit solely for the purpose 
of antislavery. 
Severe penalties, an official ban on the trade, and prize money had little effect 
over the next decade. Some of the reasons for this occurrence are apparent. First, 
although the Navy had early success against slavers, the end of the Quasi-War with 
France and President Thomas Jefferson’s blue-water fleet had forced them to exist on 
minimal appropriations. This level of funding was despite the growing threat of another 
war with the British Empire. In fact, the Navy did not see an authorization for a new 
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vessel until January 1813…months after war had already broken out. Second, a war with 
Great Britain now meant that the Navy became forced to spend what little resources it 
had on the enemy, rather than trade violators. Third, after 1813, the Navy found itself—
along with much of the sea-borne trade—blockaded in American ports. Eventually, as 
hostilities with the British ended, the Navy once again began to sail beyond the 
boundaries of the North American coastline. Settling into what would become the major 
cruising stations for the foreseeable future: the Eastern Pacific, West Indies, and 
Mediterranean squadrons. 
By 1811, the secretary of the Navy had begun to note the connection between the 
growing piratical elements in the crumbling Spanish Empire and the illegal slave trade. 
Still unable to handle these issues in a direct and consistent manner, the Navy continued 
to use an ad-hoc squadron to pursue slavers. As the illicit slave trade continued to thrive, 
and the uncertainty of the legal method of disposition of recaptured slaves continued, 
Congress looked to strengthen the 1807 anti-slave trade legislation. In 1819, Congress not 
only strengthened the 1807 law by authorizing the Navy to cruise along the African coast 
suppressing the trade, but placed recaptured slaves in federal custody instead of the state. 
The most radical element of the law provided the president with the authorization to 
“make such regulations and arrangements…for the…removal beyond the limits of the 
United States, of all such negroes, mulattoes or persons of colour, as may be delivered 
and brought within their jurisdiction.”113 Furthermore, Congress not only appointed an 
agent in Africa to deal with the freed slaves, but appropriated $100,000 to help enforce 
the law. 
                                                 
113 Du Bois, Suppression, pp. 120–21. 
67 
 
 
Not only did this legislation stand as an improvement for recaptured slaves, but 
the moneys appropriated for the enforcement of the act meant for the first time in the 
American military’s history they had a dedicated unit against the slave trade. From 1819 
forward, the United States military would be involved in some manner of foreign 
humanitarian assistance. 
The American Colonization Society (ACS) (The Founding of Liberia) 
The year 1819 signaled a new phase for both the U.S. military, as well as the 
struggle to end the slave trade. The provision for “the removal (of freedmen) beyond the 
limits of the United States” and the appointment of an Agent in Africa to help facilitate 
their resettlement all pointed to the eventual settlement of Liberia.114 Indeed, amongst the 
many sponsors of the 1819 law stood Charles F. Mercer, who was not only an outspoken 
opponent of the Atlantic Slave Trade, but led the American Colonization Society.115 
Established in Washington, D.C., the ACS116 found support among prominent 
Americans, such as Thomas Jefferson, John Tyler, Francis Scott Key, Daniel Webster, 
and Henry Clay. Although the society’s stated goal was always the resettlement of freed 
blacks in Africa, the motivations of the society were mixed.  For some members, the 
relocation of freed blacks to Africa became a solution that meant correcting centuries 
worth of injustice wrought upon American slaves. Others believed that free blacks 
represented a threat to society and feared the potential for violence as seen in the Haitian 
Revolution. The removal of freed blacks meant the threat no longer existed. A third 
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motivation held religious ties, with some members wishing to combine the creation of a 
Christian colony in Africa with a strong, zealous thrust. Finally, as an active suppression 
of the trade continued, the controversial issue surrounding the disposition of freedmen 
grew. Anti-abolitionists felt that if they continued to be set free by the federal 
government and allowed to remain within the states, a dangerous precedent could be set. 
Emancipation could gain ground. It is also important to note that many members of the 
ACS feared releasing free blacks back into Africa without institutional support. Without 
this care, these freedmen would most likely end up enslaved once again. Thus, the 
founding of a quasi-colony seemed to meet the needs of both.117 Furthermore, the 
founding of such an entity would also mean the placement of an active American 
antislavery (and antislavery trade) settlement along the western coast of Africa. An 
arrangement that would complement the British colony of Sierra Leone, which had been 
founded as an antislavery settlement and appeared to hold some measure of success in its 
mission.  
By default, the honor of carrying out the provisions of the 1819 law fell upon the 
U.S. Navy. Before the Navy could carry out its newfound humanitarian role, President 
James Monroe and his cabinet discussed the $100,000 funding. Vice-president of the 
ACS and Secretary of the Treasury, William H. Crawford, advocated turning over the 
entire amount to the Society. Among his supporters stood the Secretary of the Navy 
Smith Thompson, who felt the United States desperately needed to assert its sovereignty 
in the world. Despite the strong objection of the Secretary of State, John Quincy Adams, 
the ACS received the full amount allotted by the appropriation. The federally assigned 
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agent in Africa was to oversee the complete disbursement of the funds. During the 1820s, 
the ACS used the funds to not only transport freed slaves to Africa, but also to build, and 
in part, sustain the fledgling colony of Liberia. For its part, and until the 1840s, the Navy 
received very little funding for its stated responsibility, although they were expected to 
shepherd and support the society as they created a growing presence in Africa.118 In fact, 
in December 1819, Monroe announced that two ships—one designated as a naval 
escort—carrying agents of the Society along with a group of settlers would set sail for 
Africa. The men aboard these ships would make the preliminary arrangements required 
for creating a station that would receive freed blacks.119 
The naval vessel was none other than the frigate Cyane, a prized frigate captured 
during the War of 1812. Under the command of Captain Edward Trenchard, the Cyane 
escorted the brig Elizabeth to Africa. Within, eighty-eight freed blacks eagerly awaited to 
begin new lives. Upon their arrival in West Africa, a small group disembarked on 
Sherbro Island, just southeast of Freetown, Sierra Leone. The initial settlement location 
proved to be a poor choice. Aside from proving to be a swampy area with malaria, the 
native population harassed and threatened the poor group of interlopers. At this time, the 
ACS had not yet gained legal possession of the land in which they wished to settle. In this 
task, the U.S. Navy proved to be an invaluable resource. Reverend Samuel Bacon, the 
group’s leader, asked Trenchard not only to survey the coastal region, but to “enquire 
whether the natives would be willing to dispose of a tract of land” to be used for a 
                                                 
118 Harmond, “Suppress and Protect,” pp. 91–92. 
119 Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic, p. 154. 
70 
 
 
colony.120 Captain Trenchard quickly agreed to this request and left his Midshipmen John 
S. Townshend, as well as a small contingent of his crew, to assist the colonists as they 
began to construct their community. Thus marked the U.S. military’s growing 
relationship with FHA, one which would grow and change as years gave way to decades. 
As Trenchard and his remaining crew began to sail along the African coast, the 
most unexpected moment occurred; a moment that brought about unforeseen rewards to 
the small group of men. Just to the east of Sierra Leone off the Gallinas River, the Cyane 
chanced upon a small fleet of slavers and immediately gave chase. The frigate quickly 
over gained the little fleet and, in total, captured nine ships. As momentous an occasion it 
proved to be, the accomplishment was mixed. Of the nine vessels, four were not only 
American ships but flew the Spanish flag. The remaining were either of Spanish origin or 
undetermined nationality. Having liberated the slaves aboard, Trenchard either sent the 
ships to New York as prizes or destroyed them.121 There are no records detailing a trial 
for the Americans caught aboard the slave ships.  
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Figure 5. “Liberia.” Liberia Past and Present. 
Knowing that time may not be in his favor, Trenchard pushed forward hoping 
soon to find a suitable location for the colony. As the Cyane arrived at Cape Mesurado, 
east of Sherbro, the crew aboard hailed the site as “the most elligable situation for a 
settlement”—according to Matthew Calbraith Perry, Trenchard’s lieutenant.122 Perry, 
who would later come to command the first Africa Squadron, quickly took measures to 
secure the legal possession of the land for the settlement through a meeting with the local 
chieftains. Upon the success of the mission, the Cyane returned to Sherbro. 
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Figure 6. “U.S. Military Engagements in Africa and the Mediterranean, 1789-
1860.” Blank map from Maphill. 
From Sherbro Island, the Cyane ventured out toward the Cape Verde Islands with 
the Hornet and USS John Adams in tow. Upon their return to the African coast, and 
despite portions of the group succumbing to fever and scurvy on board, the three vessels 
managed to capture two more slavers. Although neither ships carried slaves, as the 
Hornet returned to Cuban waters in 1821, she managed to catch Le Pensee, a ship 
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carrying over two-hundred slaves. The captain of the hornet sent Le Pensee and her 
company to await trial in New Orleans.123 
Upon Trenchard’s return to Sherbo, he found the tiny settlement plagued by 
diseases and the rainy season. Of the eighty-eight original African settlers, twenty-six 
perished while only one ACS leader remained alive. Additionally, the entire naval crew 
Trenchard had left behind had also succumbed to the diseases. The colonists who 
remained retreated to the safety of Sierra Leone, while the Cyane returned back to 
Washington in December 1820.124 
A mere six months later and aboard the new schooner Shark, Perry, now 
commander of his vessel, departed from Washington with Reverend Eli Ayers, the new 
American representative for the Sherbro colony. At Sierra Leone, Perry and Ayers were 
joined by the U.S. schooner Alligator, under the command of Robert F. Stockton, who 
took the opportunity to escort Ayers to Cape Mesurado, present-day Monrovia. Upon 
their arrival at Cape Mesurado, Stockton and Ayers ventured twenty miles inland to 
finalize negotiations for the land with the local chiefs. Initially, the native Africans 
objected to the intrusions into their lands, and accused the two men of “kidnapping 
Africans” and “destroying the slave trade”—accusations that rather contradict one 
another.125 Through the use of shrewd diplomacy—at one point involving the threat of a 
cocked pistol—Stockton managed to persuade the most powerful native leader, King 
Peter, to turn over the land in exchange for a variety of trade goods valued at a few 
hundred dollars. Shortly thereafter, the Shark and the Alligator escorted the remaining 
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fifty-two colonists from Sherbro to Cape Mesurado. With the Sherbro debacle now 
behind them, the U.S. Navy had accomplished one portion of their humanitarian-filled 
mission. They had assisted the ACS in laying down the beginnings of a solid foundation 
for an antislavery colony, a land that would make up most of present-day Liberia.126  
With the Shark now patrolling the waters of western Africa, many slave traders in 
the area began to give up the use of the American flag. Instead, they began to favor the 
French flag in their efforts to continue their illicit trade. Despite Perry’s endeavors to 
curtail the slave trade, he could not overstep his bounds and violate the rights of another 
sovereign European nation. Shortly after beginning his patrols in Africa with the Shark, 
Perry stopped two slavers. The first being the schooner Ys, which belonged to the 
governor of Guadalupe, held trade goods suitable for exchanging for slaves. With the 
ships papers all in order, however, Perry was obliged to release the Ys. 
On a calm day, the Shark encountered the second vessel: a French schooner 
named Caroline, who was merely three days out of Cape Mount (south of the Gallinas 
River). For six hours Perry gave chase to the Caroline, until finally, his quarry 
surrendered and raised the French colors. Not yet ready to reveal the ship’s American 
heritage, Perry gave the order to hoist the Spanish colors and sent three officers, along 
with a small crew, to board the French vessel. W.F. Lynch, one of Perry’s midshipmen, 
wrote: 
The overpowering smell and the sight presented by her slave deck, can never be 
obliterated from the memory. In a space of about 15 by 40 feet, and four feet high, 
between decks, 164 negroes, men, women, and children, were promiscuously 
confined. In sleeping they were made to dovetail, each one drawn up to the 
shortest span, and the children obliged to lie upon the full grown. They were all 
naked, and to protect from vermin not a hair was permitted to grow upon their 
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persons. Their bodies were so emaciated, and their black skins were so shrunk 
upon the facial bones, that in their torpor, they resembled so many Egyptian 
mummies half-awakened to life. A pint of water and a half pint of rice each, was 
their daily allowance, which is reduced if the passage be prolonged. The passage 
is performed in from fifty to seventy days. I never saw the sympathies of men 
more deeply moved than were those of our crew. Immediately after taking 
possession…we hoisted up a cask of water, and some bread and beef, and gave 
each poor slave a long drink and a hearty meal.127 
Unfortunately, as the Caroline’s papers proved to be in order, in addition to 
France yet having signed an international treaty against the slave trade, Perry reluctantly 
released her. However, prior to so doing, Perry, determined to quench his moral outrage, 
persuaded the Caroline’s commanding officer sign a pledge to “abjure the slave trade 
forever.”128 
The Webster-Ashburton Treaty and the Continued Growth of U.S. Military FHA 
Despite the U.S. Navy’s valiant attempts to curb slavery, by 1839, growing 
evidence signaled that instead of dying, the slave trade was flourishing. Combined with 
the traumatic events of 1839 in which slaves violently revolted aboard a slave ship in 
American waters, the United States began to feel greater pressure toward aiding the 
international antislavery movement. The American government, for the first time, 
dispatched two naval vessels to the west coasts of Africa in order to maintain a constant 
patrol. Though the patrol may have been a token move, renewed diplomatic efforts by the 
British forced the United States to come to the negotiating table with serious intentions. 
Negotiations between both nations would result in the Webster-Ashburton Treaty 
of 1842, also known as the Treaty of Washington. Although the treaty failed to find 
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solutions to the issues on the impressment of seaman or the Right of Search, Article VII 
of the document called for each nation to “…maintain on the coast of Africa a sufficient 
squadron to enforce separately and respectively, the laws, rights and obligations of the 
two countries.”129 Each group, composed of vessels carrying a collective of eighty guns, 
would patrol independently of one another, though they would act in cooperation. On 
August 10, 1842, President Tyler signed the agreement and ten days later the Senate 
ratified it, despite the opposition of James Buchanan and Thomas Hart Benton over 
territorial and property issues.130 The Webster-Ashburton Treaty would set in motion the 
official creation of the Africa Squadron by the Navy. 
The ships sent to Africa would be required to watch a coast of roughly three 
thousand miles. Although funding increased following the signing of the Treaty of 
Washington, Perry and other U.S. naval commanders found their resources kept at 
minimal levels and would have to contend with the African climate. The intensity and 
duration of the temperatures, as well as the humidity, would come to color every aspect 
of the Navy’s job patrolling that region of the world. Despite any well-intentioned 
motivations of the Africa Patrol, many U.S. seamen would come to dread their 
assignment. 
While humanitarian missions may always have the noblest of intentions, often 
political and economic factors interject reinterpretations of the original purpose. These 
reinterpretations are not inherently dangerous for humanitarian purposes and can help to 
expand the resources available. By the 1850s, U.S. trade with Africa had grown to more 
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than 40,000 tons per year.131 In order to understand the significance of this number, 
context is required. In 1827, the U.S. traded 4,700 tons worth of goods with various 
African entities.132 With the increase in American merchant ships in African waters, the 
Navy began to reinterpret the original anti-slave trade mandate of both 1819 and 1842 to 
include its traditional protection of mercantile interests. As exports to Africa began to 
either equal or surpass those to both individual European and Latin American nations—
such as Holland and Puerto Rico—the American government’s interest in the Africa 
Patrol grew. In addition, incidents between British and American vessels decreased as 
slavers and pirates chose to fly new colors with a permanent U.S. squadron now stationed 
in Africa. Commanders, such as Perry, would come to find new rewards in Africa, 
rewards that brought both prestige and a sense of moral accomplishment. 
Matthew Perry, the younger brother of Oliver Hazard Perry, the Hero of the Battle 
of Lake Erie in the War of 1812, came from a notable naval family. Having served in the 
Navy since 1812, he appeared to be a natural choice to lead the Africa Squadron. In fact, 
the day Perry received his appointment as the flag officer133 of the unit, his enthusiasm 
for the assignment reflected in his writings to Captain Isaac.134 His previous experience 
in Africa meant he knew full well the miserable climate conditions that awaited him. 
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Believing himself to be one of the Navy’s reformers and forward thinkers of the 
era, as well as a liberal of the time, Perry may have solicited the assignment. He may also 
have held a proprietary interest as well. Members of his family, including Perry, had long 
been associated with the ACS and supported its aims. When the Cyane left port escorting 
the first freed blacks to Africa in 1820, Perry had volunteered his services.135 Upon his 
arrival at Cape Palmas, just southwest of Monrovia, on October 19, Perry sent letters to 
local evangelists requesting information. He needed data not only on the local 
inhabitants, but as to the state of the slave trade in their areas.136 Information gained from 
missionaries would later be used to help assist in combating the slave trade in and around 
the Atlantic Ocean. 
While patrolling the coastline, Perry visited the Maryland colony, which had been 
founded in 1827, and with aims similar to those of the Monrovia settlement. By 1838, the 
western coast of Africa would be home to three other colonies supported by the ACS and 
other colonization societies in the United States. All of which would eventually become 
the nation of Liberia.137 Meeting with the leaders of Monrovia and other dignitaries, 
Perry preceded to Sinou (present day Greensville) in hopes of settling a dispute with the 
Fishman. A local tribe who had previously been acting as a middleman in the slave trade 
and whose enterprise had begun to falter due to the interference and influence of the 
Liberians. In addition, Perry had to make inquiries into the death of two American 
crewman from the schooner Edward Burley.138 
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Perry’s approach to negotiations with the Fishman appears eerily similar to a 
scene that would unfold in Japan ten years later. One of Perry’s crewman, Purser Horatio 
Bridge, wrote of the event: 
At 9 A.M., thirteen boats left the different ships, armed, and having about 
seventy-five marines on board, besides the sailors. Entering the river, with flags 
flying and muskets glittering, the boats lay their oars until all were in a line, and 
then pulled at once for the beach, as if about to charge a hostile battery. The 
manoeuvre…seemed to give great satisfaction to some thirty colonists and fifty 
naked natives…assembled on the beach. The officers and marines were landed, 
and formed in line…The music then struck up, while the Commodore and 
Governor Roberts stept ashore, and the whole detachment marched to the palaver-
house.139 
Although this spectacle may seem rather overdoing it on Perry’s part, it left no 
doubt about his point. The U.S. Navy, now in force, was present in Africa and Liberians 
and their anti-slave aims were special objects of its purview. 
Up until the slave trade suppression law of 1819, the American naval forces 
efforts against the slave trade had been confined to only the Western Hemisphere on an 
ad hoc basis. With the ratification of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty and the founding of 
the American freedmen colonies along the west coast of Africa, seeing a hoisted 
American flag did not mean its misuse by slavers. With the pressure on two fronts, from 
the abolitionists at home and the British abroad, the Navy developed an intimate 
relationship with foreign humanitarian action that continues to this day. 
The Navy Continues to Fight Piracy Today 
Since the early nineteenth century, the American people have sought to protect 
their rights to liberty, and at times those of foreign citizens. Using all available resources, 
the U.S. Navy continues to battle the humanitarian crisis brought about by pirates. These 
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crises can involve the enslavement of free men, women, and children, the theft of medical 
supplies and other aid, and the loss of trade goods. Like the valiant naval commanders of 
yore, Vice Admiral Robert Moeller of the U.S. Africa Command continues the long 
tradition of patrolling the African coastlines. Challenging any and all pirates who 
continue to pose a significant threat.140 Instead of relying upon wooden schooners and 
frigates, a vast increase in both available resources and technology has, since 2009, 
allowed for the use of sophisticated armed drones. During October of that year, the 
drones seized three ships within a single week’s time off the lawless coast of East 
Africa.141 While the United States may have grown and evolved since 1819, the 
American people have not lost their sense of moral responsibility and the U.S. military 
has not lost its role in international humanitarian actions. 
A Tradition of Humanitarian Assistance 
The U.S. Government and the Great Famine 
“This is no fancy picture; but, if we are to credit the terrible accounts which reach 
us from that theatre of misery and wretchedness, is one of daily occurrence. 
Indeed, no imagination can conceive no tongue express no pencil paint the horrors 
of the scenes which are there daily exhibited.” Senator Henry Clay, 1847.142 
Between 1845 and 1852, Ireland experienced the horrors of mass starvation, 
disease, and emigration: a harsh period that historians labeled as the Great Famine or the 
Irish Potato Famine. A third of its population became solely reliant upon the potato. 
When the potato blight struck this valuable and cheap crop, nearly a quarter of Ireland’s 
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population either died or emigrated to other nations.143 Despite the racism the Irish faced 
in these countries, such as the United States, these famine-stricken people found a source 
of charity and hope, no matter how small it may have been. Within the United States, 
politicians such as Clay fought against the prejudice in hopes of guiding the charitable 
nature of the American people. In total, one hundred and eighteen vessels made the 
journey from the eastern shores of the U.S. to Ireland carrying with them relief goods: 
products whose value amounted to $545,145.144 When combined with relief donations 
that came directly from friends and relatives to the victims of the famine, the numbers are 
estimated in the millions of dollars. Though over one hundred and fifty years have 
passed, many Irish and Americans continue to be aware of the generosity that had been 
provided by private organizations. Unfortunately, far more are less familiar with the role 
the American government played. 
Despite knowing of the hardships faced by Irish men, women, and children, the 
decision to use resources toward relief efforts did not come quickly from the American 
government. From the spring of 1846 to the late winter of 1848, the United States waged 
war against the independent nation of Mexico. A war in which American territory would 
expand to the Pacific coast and the political aftermath would further raise the issue of 
slavery within the United States. So on February 8, 1847, a weighty debate occurred 
when Congressman Washington Hunt presented an Irish relief measure to his fellow 
colleges; a discussion that held the lives of people in its hands. Hunt believed that of all 
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the nations in the world, the United States stood alone as the best country to send aid to 
people beset by a blight.145 Like Clay, Hunt drew upon the charitable past of the young 
nation in order to garner support for his cause. 
In 1812, the city of Caracas, Venezuela had been stricken by an earthquake that 
caused sizeable damage. The Navy’s capability and resources, meager as they may have 
been, placed them in a unique position that allowed President James Madison and the 
American people to call upon them. That same year at the approval by both Houses of 
Congress, Madison managed to appropriate over $50,000 to use as an aid toward 
Caracas.146 With this support and the availability of naval resources, Madison provided 
humanitarian assistance to a foreign city in crisis. Assisting Hunt with the attempt to 
provide humanitarian relief to Ireland stood Senator John C. Crittenden of Kentucky. He 
insisted that Caracas merely represented a partial calamity, while famine-stricken Ireland 
epitomized a national catastrophe, yet the American government had not come to their 
aid. Crittenden and Hunt held firm to their argument, continuing that, even without the 
historical precedent, the U.S. constitution did not prohibit the charity. In his last final 
moral appeal to his fellow members, Crittenden declared, “Can you imagine any moral 
spectacle more sublime than that of one nation holding out that hand which if full of 
plenty to the suffering people of another country?”147 
Crittenden and Hunt’s proposed Irish aid bill would suffer from arguments made 
by those both for and against the bill. Ultimately, the bill would die in the House, but not 
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before it sparked a new piece of legislation that combined the capabilities of both 
governments and private entities in a common goal to help Ireland. George DeKay of 
New Jersey and Robert Forbes of Boston, along with Senator John Fairfield, would prove 
instrumental in interjecting naval resources into yet another foreign humanitarian 
mission. 
 
Figure 7. Drawing of “The Herald of Relief from America” by Thomas Nast. 
Taken from the New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/harp/0228.html 
As congress debated the Crittenden bill, a lone man walked the streets of 
downtown New York seeking an answer to a question that had plagued him for months 
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now. How could he, De Kay, help the poor, starving Irish in their time of need? As he 
wondered between the various shipping offices, he could not help but notice the frigate 
Macedonian, an old, wooden craft belonging to the U.S. Navy. Circumstances and the 
pressing need for immediate action spurred De Kay to ask a seemingly impossible 
request: could he have loan of a naval vessel. 
Having written letters to a few well-placed friends in Washington, De Kay soon 
received a surprising but encouraging response. Although President Polk had ultimately 
declined to support the proposed Irish aid bill, going so far as to threaten to veto it, he 
appeared eager to send a national response to the humanitarian crisis. Given that the 
Mexican-American already preoccupied the United States, the president felt it 
inadvisable to have the Navy provide direct assistance.148 De Kay’s request solved this 
issue. The Macedonian would be temporarily loaned to De Kay’s relief organization and 
manned by a volunteer crew, made up of mostly civilians. This solution allowed for the 
United States to provide a charitable gesture while, at the same time, it took no resources 
away from the war effort. On March 3rd, 1847, Congress approved the plan stating in a 
Congressional Resolution: 
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of 
America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is 
hereby, authorized to place at the disposal of Captain George C. De Kay, of New 
Jersey, the United States ship Macedonian, for the purpose of transporting to the 
famishing poor of Ireland and Scotland such contributions as may be made for 
their relief; and that the said Secretary be also authorized to place at the disposal 
of Captain Robert B. Forbes, of Boston, the United States sloop-of-war the 
Jamestown, for the like purpose; or, if the Secretary shall be of the opinion that 
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the public interest will be better subserved thereby, he is authorized to despatch 
said vessels upon the service aforesaid as public ships.149 
Although not as directly involved as in the fight against the international slave 
trade, once again the Navy had a role to play in foreign humanitarian assistance. 
While scholars continue to debate and criticize the outcome of American support 
for the Great Famine, the point remains that the Federal government worked with, to 
some degree, private individuals to provide relief to Ireland. The Secretary of the Navy, 
William Learned Marcy, wrote in his annual report: 
The two ships were placed at the disposal of the experienced navigators named in 
the joint resolution, respectively, and each having performed his mission of 
charity, has been returned in satisfactory condition. The sublime spectacle has 
been presented to the world, of our people in a spirit of Christian benevolence, 
relieving the suffering of the subjects of a mighty foreign power, which the vast 
resources of that great empire could not avert, and of our country, while engaged 
in a foreign war [Mexican War], furnishing from its surplus products the means of 
feeding famishing nations abroad.150 
This act of charity, on behalf of the American people, government, and military 
did not fail to take notice in Ireland. Twenty years later, Captain Forbes of the Jamestown 
ventured back to Ireland. During his visit, he met young men and women who had been 
named Jamestown and Macedonian in honor of the U.S. Navy ships that had saved their 
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parents from starvation.151 This moment would not be the last the Navy played a role in 
providing relief to the poor and starving in Ireland. 
In 1879, Ireland again experienced another famine, known as either the Irish 
famine of 1879 or the mini-famine. Unlike the Great Famine, this smaller famine did not 
lead to mass deaths, but rather caused hunger due to changes in food production 
technology. Although not as severe as the previous famine, the U.S. Navy once again 
found itself being used as a humanitarian tool. The only difference lying at this time is 
how direct the Navy and the federal government approached the matter. In his letter to 
the vice-president of the United States, Secretary of the Navy R.W. Thompson wrote: 
Hon. WILLIAM A. WHEELER, 
      Vice-President of the United States: 
Sir: I have the honor to inform the Senate that in obedience to the act approved 
February 25, 1880, I caused the United States ship Constellation to be fitted out 
for the purpose of transporting from New York to Ireland such supplies as were 
donated by the liberal-minded citizens of that city to the starving people of that 
country. That vessel, under the command of Commander Edward E. Potter, left 
New York on the 30th day of March, and has just returned. 
The Constellation reached the port of Queenstown on the 20th day of April, and 
delivered the supplies to the proper authorities at that city, whereupon they were 
immediately distributed to those in need of them. 
The authorities and people were impressed in an extraordinary degree by the fact 
that the Government of the United States had fitted out a national vessel upon this 
mission of benevolence, and demonstrated their gratitude by continued acts of 
courtesy and kindness to the officers in charge. The Government of Great Britain, 
through its minister plenipotentiary to the United States, has also expressed its 
high appreciation of this act of international comity. Evidences of these are 
herewith inclosed. 
The act of Congress contained an indefinite appropriation of "any sum of money" 
I might consider necessary for the purposes of this expedition. But I have the 
honor to inform the Senate that I have not drawn from the Treasury a single dollar 
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for the purpose, having paid the whole expense out of the ordinary appropriations 
for the support of the Navy for the present fiscal year. 
    Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
                          R. W. THOMPSON, 
                          Secretary of the Navy.152 
Like the troubled people who continued to demonstrate their gratitude toward the 
officers aboard the Constellation, the U.S. military continues to provide relief aid to 
citizens of foreign nations. From the Berlin Airlift beginning in 1948 to the 2010 
Operation Unified Response in Haiti, the federal government continues to use the 
military and its resources to spread American charity throughout the globe. 
Continued Pattern of Foreign Humanitarianism 153 
Naval Operations: 1868 Uruguay 
One action alone, no matter its length of time, does not establish a consistent 
pattern of behavior. Although the American military committed resources to ending the 
Atlantic slave trade, this action is but one small part of their humanitarian efforts. From 
fighting fires in Asia to providing relief aid in Ireland, the U.S. Army and Navy 
embodied the American spirit. Always ready to defend the rights and beliefs of its 
fatherland, while ever willing to help the downtrodden in their time of need, as resources 
allowed. 
For much of the nineteenth century, revolution and revolutionary intrigue fed 
many crises throughout much of South America. Always aware of its neighbors to the 
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South, the United States maintained an ever vigilant eye on the chaos as South Americans 
fought one another and Europe for control of their destiny. A destiny that the United 
States felt fell under its sway of influence as political policies, such as the Monroe 
Doctrine, continued from one president and congress to the next. When the United States 
signed the Webster-Ashburton Treaty of 1842, this had set aside naval resources for the 
purpose of helping to abolish the Atlantic slave trade. Although this had established the 
eventual Africa Squadron, this commitment of resources eventually led to the creation of 
several other units that patrolled the waters of the Caribbean Sea, as well as Central and 
South America. The primary concerns of these squadrons were the apprehension of slave 
traders and the protection of American commerce. Although, their proximity to chaotic 
states created moments of FHA, all of which defined a new role for their services. 
When U.S. military forces landed ashore in Uruguay, the people of a 
revolutionary-ridden country had been afforded ten comparatively tranquil years under 
the governorship of General Flores. Despite this small accordance of peace, the American 
Navy once again found itself intervening during a humanitarian crisis. In 1868, armed 
warships from six different foreign countries anchored in the harbor of Montevideo and 
landed troops on behalf of General Flores. These foreign war vessels represented the 
nations of Spain, Great Britain, France, Brazil, Italy, and the United States. 
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Figure 8. “U.S. Military Engagements in the Americas, 1789–1860.” Blank map 
taken from Maphill. 
As the governor of Uruguay, General Flores had placed his son, Colonel Fortunio 
Flores, in command of the Battalion de Libertad, a unit that stood as the regular guard of 
Montevideo. After ten short years of peace, Colonel Flores’s influence over the city 
guard and political desires began to crumble. The once loyal Battalion de Libertad turned 
against constituted authority and rose up in armed revolt against the Governor.154 Fearing 
for his safety, as well as the safety of those loyal to him and the foreign residents residing 
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in Montevideo, General Flores made a desperate plea to the American Consul, James D. 
Long, a plea Long quickly communicated to Rear Admiral Charles H. Davis of the U.S. 
Navy, the man in command of the South Atlantic squadron harbored just off the coast of 
Montevideo. 
Though Davis’s squadron was limited to his flagship Guerriere and the four 
accompanying ships named Quinnebaug, Shamokin, Kansas, and Wasp, he proved to be a 
man of quick action. On the 6th of February, Davis received Long’s communication, soon 
after, the nearby British Admiral sent a letter suggesting participation in a multilateral 
landing in the city.155 At that moment, only two outcomes existed: he either assisted in 
the landing or held his troops back. No matter the outcome, Davis now held the lives of 
civilians in his hands. Having considered the matter, he made the only decision he could. 
Shortly after, U.S. troops landed in Montevideo in cooperation with other foreign forces 
present. 
At 5:50 a.m. on February 7th, Second Lieutenant R.R. Neil led fifteen marines and 
thirty sailors onto the shores of Montevideo.156 Upon prior agreement between the 
various commanders of each respective foreign vessel, Rear Admiral Amilcare 
Anguissola, commander of the Italian squadron, assumed direct control over the 
combined landed forces then present in the harbor of Montevideo. This action took place 
in consequence to his seniority. 
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The following noon, on February 8th, Anguissola ordered all troops to return to 
their respective ships upon receiving a letter from Governor Flores stating all difficulties 
had ceased to exist. Fortunately, the uprising had held little to no political significance, 
and the death count remained low. Lieutenant Neil and his troop’s presence had helped to 
prevent any potential harm to General Flore’s loyalists and foreign residents of the city 
by standing as an impromptu security force to the 70,000 inhabitants of Montevideo.157 
In his report, Admiral Davis wrote: 
The predominance of foreign interests here (Montevideo), and in the large cities 
of the Argentine Republic, will probably render it expedient at no distant period, 
to confer upon them a permanent defence against these frequent insurrections or 
revolts, very few of which possess any color of a motive, such as would justify 
resistance of legal authority.158 
By the 19th of February, Davis would once again land troops in Montevideo at the 
request of the American Consulate and the President of the Republic following the 
assassination of General Flores. 
From the nineteenth century forward, Latin America would become a continual 
site for American involvement and intervention. Whether it is a location for trade, 
humanitarian intervention, or leisure, the American people would keep an ever watchful 
eye on their neighbors to the south. 
Naval Operations: 1873 Colombia 
In July 1810, Colombia declared its independence from Spain. Having maintained 
its independence barely more than three decades prior, the United States stood as the first 
foreign government to recognize Colombia’s independence. For nearly four decades, the 
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new nation of Colombia and her people experience tranquility and stability. In 1858, 
Colombia began its descent into unrest and revolution as different factions began to fight 
for control, factions that placed the lives of not only Colombian’s at risk, but foreigners 
and their property as well. Revolutions always create humanitarian crises, moments that 
can allow the foreign nations to exert the logistical capabilities of their militaries to 
provide aid and security, if needed. 
As hostilities again broke out in the first half of 1873 over the possession of 
Panama, the U.S. South Pacific squadron, led by Rear Admiral Charles Steedman, arrived 
on May 7th in the bay of Panama. Like Davis, Steedman faced a decision that held the 
potential for both economic and humanitarian disaster. With the state of Panama in crisis 
and political leaders in Colombia unable to provide security to its residents, Steedman 
answered the request of the American Consulate and residents of Panama by dispatching 
First Lieutenant Henry J. Bishop. Unlike in Uruguay, the U.S. Navy faced this situation 
alone. Knowing full well the difficulties and dangers that existed for the foreign residents 
of Panama and his soldiers, Steedman sent with Bishop a force of forty-four marines, 160 
sailors, and four pieces of artillery.159 The conflicting factions in Panama avoided the 
rapid response security force. As the hostilities began to subside by May 12th, Davis 
recalled his troops.160 Unfortunately, this hostility in Panama would become routine, 
leading to many more moments where the residents called for humanitarian action. 
Days turned to weeks, weeks to months, but eventually the tranquility that the 
state of Panama had found following May 12th once again gave way to the political 
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instability found in the United States of Colombia. On early September, the thousands of 
foreign residents cried out for some semblance of safety, of security. Different political 
factions within the states of Colombia had resumed their fight for power over the 
region.161  Captain Albert G. Clary, the commander of the U.S.S. Benicia, arrived first at 
the scene. Admiral Steedman, with his flagship the Pensacola, arrived shortly thereafter. 
Upon his arrival on the 18th, Steedman hurriedly consulted with the American Consul. 
Believing the conditions had escalated into a humanitarian crises, the diplomat urged 
Steedman to land an armed force once again upon the shores of Panama.162 Members of 
the various factions had come to blame the foreigners for the chaotic state Colombia now 
faced. This belief had already led to the death and destruction of some foreign citizens 
and their property in the State of Panama. The American Consul believed that, as in May, 
the solution to the growing humanitarian crisis laid in a show of force. The Colombian’s 
lack of safety precautions for foreign residents had Steedman in agreement with the 
Consul. 
Knowing the situation may call for a prolonged stay ashore, Steedman kept his 
men ashore until, four days later on the 22nd, Rear Admiral John J. Almy arrived, and he 
turned over command. Steedman acquainted Almy with the local conditions and the 
American Consul’s advice. Having looked into the matter himself, Admiral Almy 
ordered a landing force of one-hundred marines and sailors, along with two howitzers, 
the following day.163 Within a matter of days, Almy proceeded to send a greater number 
                                                 
161 United States Department of the Navy, Report of the Secretary of the Navy… Forty-Third Congress, p. 
261. 
162 Ibid., p. 261–262. 
163 Ellsworth, One Hundred Eighty Landings, p. 47. 
94 
 
 
of troops ashore in order to reinforce those who had first landed. By the end of 
September, the humanitarian crisis present in Panama appeared to have passed its climax. 
As September ended, and October began, President Niera of the State of Panama, 
escorted by the American Ambassador, met with Admiral Almy aboard his vessel.164 
Three days later, Almy started to withdraw his troops from Panama. By the 9th of 
October, Almy had completely ceased all ground operations in the country. Although he 
had withdrawn all of his troops, Admiral Almy remained in the harbor until October 24th, 
while the Benicia did not depart until December 14th.165 Having already once committed 
resources to protecting American interests and foreign residents in Panama, Almy felt the 
delicate political situation present in the United States of Colombia required a prolonged 
American presence in Panama. This presence helped to bring an immediate sense of 
stability to the region of Panama it inhabited. As nations around the globe continued to 
exhibit disruptive internal behavior, the U.S. Navy, sent to protect American interests 
aboard, would find itself continuing a decades-old tradition of performing foreign 
humanitarian aid in the process. 
Naval Operations: 1882 Egypt 
The need for humanitarian aid arises for many different reasons: famine, political 
instability, and war name merely a few of them. In 1882, Egyptian and Sudanese forces 
under Colonel Ahmed ‘Urabi clashed against the might of the Imperial British Empire 
creating a moment in human history known as the Anglo-Egyptian War. The outcome of 
which produced a humanitarian crisis the United States could not freely ignore. 
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As European nations continued to conquer and divide the known world amongst 
themselves, chaos sprang forth. Disorder, hate, and anarchy gave rise to armed militants. 
Many of whom merely saw themselves as patriots attempting to break the shackles that 
an alien power had either already placed upon them or appeared to be about to place. In 
1878, Arhmed ‘Urabi, an Egyptian army officer, mutinied and began a coup against the 
Khedive of Egypt and Sudan. Among his reasons and concerns, ‘Urabi held a grievance 
over disparities in pay between Europeans and Egyptians.166 As ‘Urabi led a revolt 
against the Khedive, the British and French Empires lent their support in terms of both 
military aid and political notices. By 1882, the situation in Egypt had begun to spiral 
quickly out of control. On May 20th, British and French warships sat anchored off the 
coast of Alexandria, waiting for the right moment to strike. Nearly three weeks later on 
June 11th, Colonel ‘Urabi’s control over the city began to slip. An anti-Christian riot 
spread through portions of the city, leading to the deaths of fifty Europeans. As ‘Urabi 
ordered his troops to put down the riot, any European who could find a way to flee the 
city did so as ‘Urabi’s forces began to fortify the town.167 On July 11th, British warships 
began a ten and one-half hour bombardment of Alexandria, a bombardment of which 
Rear Admiral Reginald F. Nicholson of the American Navy bore witness. 
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Figure 9. Photography of the bazaar in Alexandria after the bombardment. 
Taken from the American Univeristy in Cario, 
http://digitalcollections.aucegypt.edu/cdm/singleitem/collection/p15795coll9/id/160 
Having taken notice of the activity in and around Egypt, the United States had 
sent Nicholson to observe conditions, and if necessary take any action deemed necessary 
to protect American interests. On June 27th, Nicholson arrived off the coast of Alexandria 
with his flagship, the Lancaster, and within two weeks the Quinnebaug (July 1st) and 
Nipsic (July 12th) came in tow.168 By the time the Nipsic arrived in Alexandria, the 
British bombardment of the city had ended, but the consequences of the action had only 
just begun. 
Prior to the shelling, ‘Urabi’s control over the city could be described as tenuous, 
at best. After the barrage, the city slipped into a state of complete chaos: fire, pillage, 
murder, and rapine occurred throughout the city. Just as before the bombardment, 
foreigners again found themselves to be subject to these outrages. As Admiral Nicholson 
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observed these transgressions take place, he came to a decision; for humanity’s sake, he 
deployed troops into Alexandria in order to stem the mayhem that now ran abundantly.169 
After having consulted with the British Admiral, Beauchamp Seymour, Nicholson issued 
orders for a landing party. A small group of seventy-three men, made up of both officers 
and soldiers, quickly descended from the three American ships toward the shore of 
Alexandria. Their mission was to assist in restoring order, prevent further destruction, 
combat the fires raging through the city, re-establish the American consulate, and “look 
after American interests in general.”170 Although the British bombarded the city and 
assisted the citizens of Alexandria in escaping the depths of anarchy, the U.S. Marines 
arrived first into the city to help provide humanitarian aid. The British followed closely 
behind in their footsteps, bringing with them a force of nearly four thousand. Other 
foreign nations in the immediate area proved just as quick. 
Aside from providing emergency services for the city, Nicholson made available 
his ships to refugees. Immediately following the severe bombardment, the Lancaster, 
Quinnebaug, and Nipsic became temporary shelters and acted as such for some time 
thereafter.171 Both Egyptian citizens and foreign residents proved quick in taking 
Nicholson up on his offer for men, women, and children of all walks of life taking 
residence aboard the American vessels. Conditions within the city improved so rapidly 
that all U.S. sailors who went ashore returned to their respective ships by the 15th. Five 
days later, Admiral Nicholson ordered the return of all marines except for a small detail 
from the Quinnebaug, who, under the command of Lieutenant Denny, remained in 
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Alexandria until the 24th. Both the Lancaster and Nipsic departed on the 20th of July 
while the Quinnebaug remained until the 29th of August.172 Unable to ignore a city beset 
during a moment of crisis, Nicholson and those under his command continued an 
American tradition, a tradition of using military resources to provide various forms of 
humanitarian aid. 
Since the nineteenth century, the U.S. has used its military to help provide aid to 
nations ravaged by war, disease, and weather. While all U.S. action taken abroad 
inherently holds American interests as a top priority, Americans have also held dear to 
themselves a belief in American morality.  From allowing Egyptians and foreign 
residents to take shelter aboard their naval vessels to the typhoon aid provided to the 
Philippines following Typhoon Haiyan in 2013, the American people and their 
government continue to use their military resources to provide humanitarian assistance on 
a global scale. 
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CONCLUSION 
By 1898, the United States military had become involved in dozens of 
humanitarian crises that ranged from fighting fires to providing temporary security. Many 
of these instances occurred during the height of a humanitarian crisis and required quick 
decisions by military officers and, at times, American consuls. Though often rarer, the 
legislative branch of the American government proved capable of creating distinct pieces 
of legislation that led to the Navy’s direct and indirect involvement in FHA. The Act of 
1819 not only strengthened the Navy’s ability to protect American interests abroad, but 
expanded both its logistical capabilities and created a dedicated unit whose 
responsibilities included suppressing the Atlantic slave trade.173 In addition, as famines 
struck various portions of the world, such as Ireland, the U.S. military would continue to 
form relationships with NGOs. These associations allowed for the temporary lending of 
military equipment and materials for humanitarian purposes.174 Seventy years before the 
Spanish-American War, the professional military in America would come to find its role 
to be ever growing. Though they fought numerous battles against foreign nations and 
fellow Americans, their ever growing capability lent to their ability to become a 
multifaceted tool. 
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The U.S. military’s real contribution to foreign humanitarian assistance was their 
consistency in providing aid to foreign peoples and nations without demanding requests 
in return. The United States did not create the concept of humanitarian aid nor was it 
alone in using its military to provide support. Before the Act of 1819, the British Empire 
had not only begun to ban slavery within its boundaries, but had founded an African 
settlement, Sierra Leone: a freedman colony where it transported free slaves and 
established a squadron with the express purpose of suppressing the Atlantic slave trade. 
So while the United States should not receive credit for establishing the trend of using 
one’s military in humanitarian endeavors, the U.S. military’s ties to FHA begin as early 
as its counterparts in Europe. Though the United States stood as a newborn nation 
amongst its aging European counterparts, the country’s willingness to quickly assert its 
hard-earned independence led to numerous global encounters. Other nations did not 
always show the fiery and, at times, rash spirit during moments of turbulence, and those 
who suffered at these moments took notice. As a young nation, the United States 
provided this sense of spirit. Despite the national politics that Southerners dominated, 
naval officers, from the north or the south, attempted to perform their duties to the best of 
their ability. The need to help their fellow man in their times of crises, while present to 
the situation, became one of their responsibilities. 
With a growing demand from the American populace to right the wrongs 
committed by the seemingly inept and corrupt Spanish Empire, the United States did not 
land its troops on foreign soil in 1898 in the name of humanitarianism for the first time. 
No, decades of prior experience and tradition landed alongside those troops, the same 
tradition of a fiery spirit that had seen American troops land in the Caribbean and China 
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in 1866, or in Alexandria in 1882. Eventually, this practice would lead to Congress 
actively shaping the Department of Defense’s role in humanitarian operations through a 
broad range of authorities contained in the Armed Services (Title 10 U.S. Code) and 
Foreign Relations and Intercourse (Title 22 U.S. Code) statutes, and through annual 
legislation. In addition, each branch of the military would develop more defined and 
official doctrines in response to this ever-increasing humanitarian role. As Americans 
continue to venture forth on the path of humanism, they bring with them both history and 
a sense of tradition. 1898 and 1948 are both important years for the U.S. military 
regarding foreign humanitarian assistance, but neither mark a beginning point. Instead, 
they remain as links in a pattern of American behavior nearly as old as the nation. 
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APPENDIX 
U.S. Military Engagements, 1789–2011 
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Table A.1 Chronological List of U.S. Military Foreign Humanitarian Assistance 
Date Location Type of Activity 
19th century 
1812 Venezuela Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
March 3, 1819–Present Africa, Americas, Asia Slave Trade Patrol 
February 12, 1825 St. Thomas, VI Fire Fighting 
Fall 1831/ January 1832 Falkland Islands Evacuation 
October 1833 Argentina Police Support 
June 6, 1851 Johanna Island Police Activities 
February 5, 1852 Nicaragua Fire Fighting 
September 11, 1853 China Police Support 
May 23–27, 1870 Colombia Police Activities 
April 30, 1866 Caribbean Police Support 
August 9, 1866 China Fire Fighting 
February 7–27, 1868 Uruguay Police Support, Relief Aid 
June 25, 1873 Peru Fire Fighting 
July 12–August 29, 1882 Egypt Police Support, Relief Aid 
April 1884 Arctic Rescue 
Feb 8, 1890 Japan Fire Fighting 
July 2, 1891 Bering Sea Environmental Law Enforcement 
March 4, 1895 Trinidad Fire Fighting 
April 25–August 12, 1898 
Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, Philippines, 
Guam 
Liberation Campaign 
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20th/21st Centuries 
March 1904 Korea Evacuation 
January 17, 1907 Jamaica Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
September 5, 1913 Mexico Evacuation 
October 12, 1920 Dominican Republic Fire Fighting 
September, 1930 Dominican Republic Disaster (Hurricane) Relief 
March 31, 1931 Nicaragua Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
August 20–30, 1939 Tientsin, China Disaster (Flood) Relief 
November 1946–47 China Relief Aid 
March 1948 China Fire Fighting 
June 1948–May 1949 West Berlin Relief Aid 
1952-Present Micronesia Relief Aid 
August 14–19, 1953 Greece Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
October 13–19, 1954 Haiti Disaster (Flood) Relief 
October 2–13, 1955 Mexico Disaster (Flood) Relief 
October 16, 1957 Spain Disaster (Flood) Relief 
January, 1958 Ceylon Disaster (Flood) Relief 
April 28, 1958 Morocco Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
August 14–20, 1959 Taiwan Disaster (Flood) Relief 
February 29, 1960 Morocco Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
June 26–July 15, 1960 Chile Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
November–December, 1960 Haiti Disaster (Flood) Relief 
January 20, 1961 Congo Relief Aid 
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May 20, 1961 Turkey Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
November 1–17, 1961 British Honduras Disaster (Hurricane) Relief 
November 20, 1962 Guam Disaster (Typhoon) Relief 
May 8, 1963 Haiti Evacuation 
October 20, 1963 Haiti Disaster (Hurricane) Relief 
Summer 1964 Peru Medical Aid 
August–September, 1964 Haiti, Dom. Rep. Disaster (Hurricane) Relief 
September 14–30, 1964 Vietnam Disaster (Typhoon) Relief 
November 10–23, 1964 Vietnam Disaster (Typhoon) Relief 
April 27, 1965 Dom. Rep. Evacuation 
October 14–16, 1966 Mexico Disaster (Hurricane) Relief 
June 12–22, 1970 Peru Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
September 14–23, 1970 Philippines Disaster (Typhoon) Relief 
October 21–25, 1970 S. Vietnam Disaster (Typhoon) Relief 
October 1970 S. Vietnam Disaster (Typhoon) Relief 
July, 1972 Philippines Disaster (Typhoon) Relief 
March, 1973 Tunisia Disaster (Flood) Relief 
December, 1973 Tunisia Disaster (Flood) Relief 
July 22, 1974 Cyprus Evacuation 
August, 1974 Philippines Disaster (Flood) Relief 
April 12, 1975 Cambodia Evacuation 
April 29, 1975 S. Vietnam Evacuation 
June/July, 1976 Lebanon Evacuation 
September, 1979 Caribbean Disaster (Hurricane) Relief 
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October 12, 1980 Algeria Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
June 24, 1982 Lebanon Evacuation 
August–September, 1982 Lebanon Evacuation 
September, 1982 Lebanon Peace Support 
February 21–24. 1983 Lebanon Disaster (Snow Storm) Relief 
July 18, 1990 Philippines Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
May 25, 1990 Liberia Evacuation 
January 2, 1991 Somalia Evacuation 
April–October, 1991 N. Iraq Disaster Relief 
May, 1991 Bangladesh Disaster Relief 
June, 1991 Philippines Disaster Relief 
April 13, 1992 Italy Disaster Relief 
May–June, 1992 Micronesia Disaster Relief 
July, 1992 Iceland Search and Rescue 
July 1992 (continuing) Bosnia Relief Aid 
August 1992–February 
1993 Somalia Relief Aid 
August–September, 1992 Guam Disaster (Typhoon) Relief 
December 1992–May 1993 Somalia Relief Aid 
August 1993 Tunisia Fire Fighting 
June 2005 Pakistan Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
August 2008 Georgia Relief Aid 
January 2011 Nicaragua Relief Aid 
March 2011 Japan Disaster (Earthquake) Relief 
April 2011 Afghanistan Disaster (Mudslide) Relief 
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